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This thesis presents a method for countering Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in 
networks that provide Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees using Differentiated Service 
(DiffServ).  This approach uses feedback from the DiffServ provider to initiate packet 
signing at the source.  The signature allows the DiffServ provider to distinguish valid 
packets from malicious packets.  This mechanism can also be used to provide key 
management for other digital signature methods, such as the Internet Protocol 
Authentication Header (IP AH).  However, unlike other methods, our solution requires no 
encryption or cryp tographic processing on a per-packet basis.  Instead, it utilizes the 
sender’s ability to alter its packet signatures faster than the attacker can duplicate the 
changes.  This method also avoids the fragmentation and decreased throughput associated 
with increased packet size of IP AH through use of existing fields in the IP header.  This 
method results in a significant reduction in valid packets that are dropped during a DoS 
attack.  Thus, a DiffServ provider would be able to maintain QoS guarantees during an 
attack without incurring the overhead associated with cryptographic signatures.  A C++ 
implementation of this DoS countermeasure for the ns2 network simulator and the 
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Future military networks such as the Navy’s FORCENet concept will carry traffic 
between many dissimilar groups of users simultaneously.  Traffic may be operational or 
administrative, and of varying precedence.  Military networks must be able to determine 
which traffic should receive higher priority.  For example, traffic between forces in 
combat must be given priority over routine administrative traffic.  The current model of 
Internet routing provides only Best Effort service.  No guarantees are made with respect 
to how, when, or if traffic will reach its intended destination.  Traffic that requires 
Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees - priority over other traffic or specific bounds with 
respect to transmission quality - is at a disadvantage in a best effort environment.  
Differentiated Service (DiffServ) is a method of providing QoS guarantees to network 
traffic by aggregating similar traffic and giving priority to specific aggregates. 
A Denial of Service (DoS) occurs when users are prevented from utilizing a 
service provided by a system.  The most widespread method of creating a DoS is by 
artificial exhaustion of a resource, such as bandwidth, processor cycles, or memory.  A 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one in which an attacker uses the 
combined power of many hosts to exhaust the resources of a server.  New types of DoS 
attacks will accompany implementation of the DiffServ model.  The separation of traffic 
into aggregates will make it easier for an attacker to target a specific subset of traffic 
flowing in the network.  DiffServ also offers new possibilities for the prevention of DoS 
attacks, since a DiffServ provider will have more information about its clients than is 
currently tracked using today’s implementation of the protocols found on the Internet. 
B. PURPOSE 
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop and test a mechanism for preventing 
DoS attacks in DiffServ networks.  Secondary goals necessary to accomplish this include 
determination of the topologies likely to be used in future DiffServ networks, 
examination of the specific vulnerabilities of these topologies to DoS attack, creation of 
an analytic model that can be used to calculate the effectiveness of a DoS 
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countermeasure, and implementation of the DoS countermeasure as an extension of an 
existing network simulator. 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is limited to (a) a review of the Differentiated Services 
standard, (b) determination of the constraints DoS networks will impose on new DoS 
attacks, (c) development of a feedback-based DoS countermeasure for use by DiffServ 
clients and providers, and (d) implementation and testing of the countermeasure in the 
ns2 network simulator. 
D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis explores the possible changes in the manner in which DoS attacks are 
conducted that will accompany widespread implementation of DiffServ in the next-
generation Internet.  A technique is presented for countering DoS attacks against 
DiffServ networks.  This technique can also be used in certain cases to detect illegitimate 
use of premium services without payment.  An implementation of the technique in a 
common open-source network simulator is provided.  The theoretical performance of this 
technique is derived mathematically and compared to the results obtained by simulation.  
The communication method used in this technique may be useful in other applications as 
well. 
E. RELATED WORK 
A summary of this research was submitted to the 10th International Conference on 
Telecommunications Systems, Modeling, and Analysis (ICTSM 10) as a paper entitled A 
Feedback Mechanism for Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks against Differentiated 
Services Clients [BRAUN02].  This thesis presents the material covered in that paper and 
expands upon it. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
· Chapter II is an overview of network QoS in general and DiffServ in particular. 
· Chapter III is an examination of attacks used in the existing Internet and the 
methods proposed to defeat them.  The effectiveness of these attacks and methods 
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in DiffServ networks is discussed.  Differences in DoS attacks and the scenarios 
in which they would be possible and effective against a DiffServ network are 
discussed. 
· Conceptual details of the DoS countermeasure developed by this thesis are given 
in Chapter IV.  This chapter also includes a derivation of the theoretical 
effectiveness of the countermeasure 
· Chapter V describes how the proposed DoS countermeasure was implemented.  It 
includes a description of the design and architecture of the ns2 network simulator.  
Specific modifications to the simulator are discussed in detail. 
· Chapter VI sets for the simulated topology, experimental design, and simulation 
results. 
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II. NETWORK QUALITY OF SERVICE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Providing Quality of Service guarantees is one of the next steps in the evolution 
of Internet routing.  Networks that provide QoS guarantees allocate resources (queue 
space, bandwidth, etc.) to traffic flows differently based on the source and type of each 
flow.  The performance of applications such as streaming audio and video, Voice over IP 
(VoIP), and video teleconferencing can be degraded by network congestion or losses.  
Implementation of QoS guarantees can eliminate degradation and ensure fairness for all 
flows.  Current and proposed types of service are discussed below. 
B. BEST EFFORT SERVICE 
The current model of Internet routing provides only best effort service – no 
guarantees are made with respect to jitter (inter-packet arriva l time), latency (delay 
between transmission and receipt), error rate, or loss rate (number of dropped packets).  
Best Effort service does not prioritize one type of traffic over another, even in cases 
where it could be done easily and at low cost.  All traffic is treated equally, which puts 
traffic that requires limitations on the aforementioned qualities at a disadvantage.  Time-
sensitive traffic can be delayed or lost due to congestion caused by applications that do 
not have any specific latency requirements. 
Best Effort service does have certain advantages.  It does not require routers to set 
up end-to-end connections or maintain state information on a per-flow basis.  Best Effort 
routers also do not need to allocate or manage multiple queues for multiple traffic flows. 
C. INTEGRATED SERVICE 
One proposed alternative to Best Effort service is to monitor each end-to-end 
connection, hereinafter referred to as a flow, and selectively determine the order and 
direction in which packets are transmitted based on the QoS guaranteed to each flow.  
This provides a much finer granularity of service, since it allows prioritization at the flow 
level.  However, this method is not feasible for use in the Internet because it is not 
scalable to large networks.  It requires end-to-end connection setup for each flow, which 
in turn requires every router along the path of the flow to maintain state information 
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about the flow.  In the network core, where the paths of many flows overlap and traffic 
volume is very large, routers do not have the queue space or processing resources that 
would be required to monitor every flow passing through them. 
D. DIFFERENTIATED SERVICE 
Differentiated Service is a method of providing QoS to traffic flows without 
having to the maintain flow state information at every router.  Traffic classification is 
distributed to the edges of the network where volume is lighter.  Edge routers police 
traffic entering a network based on the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the 
source and the domain operator.  Traffic is classified and conditioned to conform to one 
of a fixed number of specific behavior aggregates, which are pre-defined throughout the 
DiffServ domain.  Per-hop behavior (PHB) is defined as “a description of the externally 
observable forwarding treatment applied at a differentiated services-compliant node to a 
behavior aggregate”[RFC2474].  The treatment that traffic assigned to an aggregate will 
receive at core routers is determined by the PHB associated with that aggregate.  This is 
known as core-stateless routing.  Core routers do not track the state of individual flows.  
They are only responsible for forwarding based on the classification assigned to each 
packet when it entered the network. 
1. Architecture  
DiffServ has not yet been implemented on a large scale in the Internet.  
Implementation will not happen all at once, but will occur in individual domains as 
service providers upgrade equipment and software in their networks.  A DiffServ domain 
is defined as 
“…a contiguous portion of the Internet over which a consistent set of 
differentiated services policies are administered in a coordinated 
fashion….”[RFC2474] 
The DiffServ code-point is defined as the first six bits of the eight-bit Type of 
Service (ToS) field in a packet’s IP header.  Each behavior aggregate is identified by a 
single DiffServ code-point.  When a packet reaches the ingress router of a DiffServ 
domain, the ingress router will mark it by changing the value of the DiffServ code-point 
to the code-point associated with the correct aggregate for that packet.  Packets from 
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unrecognized sources, i.e. those that do not have an SLA with the domain, are assigned a 
default code-point.  Core routers treat packets with the default code-point as Best Effort 
traffic, thus ensuring backwards compatibility for traffic arriving from non-DiffServ 
domains. 
It is important to note that all routers in the DiffServ domain that are linked to 
other domains must be configured as ingress routers.  This provides access control to the 
QoS guarantees provided by the DiffServ domain.  Within the core of the network, 
packets are forwarded according to the per-hop behavior associated with the DiffServ 
code-point [RFC2474].  Traffic entering a core router without first being marked by an 
ingress router would be forwarded based on the code-point it arrived in the DiffServ 
domain with.  This would allow service theft - a situation in which some traffic receives 
preferred treatment that it is not entitled to receive.  Service theft could be accomplished 
by setting the traffic’s code-point to one that receives premium treatment by the DiffServ 
core routers. 
2. Possible DiffServ Topologies 
The proximity of the client and receiver to the DiffServ network affects the path 
that DiffServ traffic will follow.  This path in turn affects the guarantees the provider can 
make to clients.  There are three types of connection paths possible, as shown in Figure 
2.1. 
a. End-to-End Single Provider Path 
In this topology, clients and receivers are directly linked to a single 
DiffServ domain.  Traffic receives QoS guarantees over its entire path.  These guarantees 
are offered and ensured by a single DiffServ provider.  In Figure 2.1, traffic from A to B 
would follow this type of path. 
b. End-to-End Multiple Provider Path 
In this topology, clients and receivers are connected to different DiffServ 
domains.  Traffic flows on a path through different domains, but still receives QoS 
guarantees over the entire path.  All individual domains along the path must agree to 
provide QoS guarantees to traffic arriving from upstream DiffServ domains.  In Figure 
2.1, traffic from B to D follows this type of path. 
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c. Partial Best-Effort Path 
In this topology, the traffic from client to receiver transits a non-DiffServ-
capable domain at some point.  QoS is provided only during the times when the traffic is 
in a DiffServ domain.  In Figure 2.1, traffic from C to D and from A to C follows this 
type of path. 















III. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The goal of Denial of Service attacks is to prevent users from utilizing a service 
that a system is providing.  DoS attacks may target individual flows and groups of flows 
or they may be indiscriminate.  They may require the compromise of network devices, 
i.e. hosts, servers, and routers.  These devices may not have to be along the path of a 
targeted flow in order for an attack to be effective.  General types of interference, tactics 
that support or enable attacks, methods of interfering with or denying services, and the 
feasibility of these methods are discussed below. 
B. TYPES OF INTERFERENCE 
Denial of Service can be accomplished by disabling network hardware or 
software, by directly manipulating user traffic, or through misuse or abuse of legitimate 
protocols that interferes with the flow of user traffic.  Network interference, traffic 
interference, or both can be used to create DoS attacks. 
1. Network Interference 
Network interference is the result of rendering network hardware or software 
inoperative.  This disruption stops the normal function of a part of the network.  
Exploitation of flaws in network software that cause it to stop operating properly or halt 
is an example of software interference.  Hardware interference can be accomplished by  
· cutting a network link  
· removing power from a network device 
· jamming frequencies used by wireless access points.   
Although network interference may have a disproportionate affect on certain 
traffic sources or destinations due to their proximity to the disruption, it is usually 
indiscriminate since it affects all traffic attempting to transit the damaged portion of the 
network.  An attacker would not need to compromise any network devices to create this 
kind of interference. 
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2. Traffic Interference 
Traffic interference consists of any improper delay, manipulation, or dropping of 
packets.  An attacker can interfere with traffic either directly or indirectly. 
a. Direct Interference 
In order to directly interfere with network traffic, the attacker must 
compromise a network device and alter the way the device performs.  This type of 
interference may be targeted or indiscriminate.  For example, if a router is compromised 
and instructed to drop every third packet received, the attack would be indiscriminate.  A 
targeted attack would consist of interfering with traffic originating from or destined to a 
specific host or hosts.  If the attack is targeted, the compromised device must be along the 
path of the target flow(s). 
b. Indirect Interference 
Unlike network or direct traffic interference, indirect traffic interference 
does not disrupt operation of network devices and protocols along the path of the target 
flows.  The attacker attempts to exhaust some resource, such as link bandwidth or router 
memory, by overwhelming it with apparently valid traffic.  Once the resource reaches 
100% utilization, any additional traffic attempting to use it must be dropped.  The 
percentage of valid traffic that will be dropped is inversely proportional to the ratio of the 
demand for the resource to its capacity.  For example, if the attacker can raise the demand 
for a link to 10 times its capacity, then only 1 in 10 packets arriving at the link will be 
transmitted.  This method is indirect because harm to valid traffic is the result of 
processing invalid traffic, not direct manipulation. 
C. ENABLING TACTICS  
This section discusses two tactics that do not constitute DoS attacks themselves, 
but which are widely used in the conduct of DoS attacks. 
1. IP Header Manipulation 
IP header manipulation is an enabling tool for the majority of indirect DoS 
attacks.  As the name suggests, it consists of altering fields in the IP headers of packets.  
Under normal conditions, a host will place its IP address in the IP header Source Address 
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field.  For most methods of attack, the IP Source Address field of outgoing packets is 
changed.  This is commonly known as address spoofing. 
Source address spoofing serves two purposes in DoS attacks.  First, it makes it 
impossible for a receiver to determine the true source of an attacker’s packets.  Second, 
any replies to the source of packets with spoofed IP addresses will be sent to the spoofed 
address in the header instead. 
2. Compromised Hosts 
Network or Internet servers must be able to handle connections from hundreds or 
thousands of clients simultaneously.  Therefore, the bandwidth of inbound links to 
servers must be several orders of magnitude larger than the outbound bandwidth of 
individual clients.  This makes it very unlikely that an attacker will be able to conduct a 
bandwidth consumption attack by using a single host.  Most indirect interference attacks 
require that production of malicious traffic be spread among hundreds of individual hosts; 
hence the term distributed DoS.  
An attacker can obtain a DDoS flood source by breaking into a host and installing 
a DDoS attack tool.  Once the tool has been installed, the host will respond to commands 
sent from an attack manager under the attacker’s control.  The attack manager, which is 
also a compromised host, maintains a list of the compromised flood sources.  To initiate 
and control an attack, the attacker sends commands to the manager, which in turn sends 
commands to the individual hosts.  These commands include the type of attack to be 
conducted, start and stop times, and the target of the attack.  Use of this three-tiered 
system makes it difficult or impossible to trace an attack back to the perpetrator. 
D. ATTACK PATH 
DoS attack traffic may flow directly from source to target, or it may be sent to an 
intermediate host.  The latter indirect path is a characteristic of reflected attacks (RDoS or 
RDDoS).  When sending packets to an intermediate host, the attacker spoofs the target’s 
IP address in source address field of the attack packets.  The third-party host becomes an 
unwitting participant in the attack by sending a reply to what it thinks is the source of the 
packets, but which is actually the attack target.  Using a reflector in this manner further 
obfuscates the true source of the attack. 
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E. ATTACK METHODS 
Methods of creating a denial of service vary based on the equipment and 
protocols being used by the service provider and the resources available to the attacker.  
Attack methods based on network interference or direct packet manipulation are both 
possible and highly effective.  However, these types of interference must generally be 
countered through implementation of physical security or access control mechanisms, 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis.  This section focuses on various known 
methods of indirectly attacking network traffic. 
1. TCP Flooding 
The TCP handshake consists of a series of request and acknowledgement 
messages used to set up a TCP connection between a client and server.  A client initiates 
a TCP connection request by sending a SYN segment to the server.  When the server 
receives a SYN segment, it attempts to create a new connection by allocating resources, 
replying with a SYN/ACK segment, and waiting for a reply from the SYN originator.  If 
no reply is received, the connection will eventually timeout and the resources allocated to 
the connection will be released. 
To exploit this protocol, the attacker floods the target with SYN segments with 
invalid and unreachable source addresses.  A host will normally send a RESET segment 
to the source of an unexpected TCP segment.  The RESET segment allows the original 
source to release resources reserved for the connection.  However, since the requesting 
address is unreachable, no RESET reply to the target’s SYN/ACK segments will ever be 
received.  If the attacker can send enough requests to use up all available resources before 
incomplete connections begin to timeout, the target will not be able to accept any further 
SYN segments, resulting in a DoS to legitimate clients.  Some variations of this attack 
use randomly spoofed source addresses to get past filters on the target system that are set 
up to stop packets originating from a single source.  This type of attack follows a direct 
path to the target. 
Various other malformed TCP segments can be flooded at a host to elicit RESET 
responses.  This can be used in an attempt to consume the available bandwidth between a 
target and its connection to the Internet, or as a reflected attack against another host. 
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The effect of TCP flooding is generally indirect interference, since the processing 
of invalid requests prevents service to valid requests.  However, it can cause network 
interference if exhausting the server’s resources causes it to stop functioning. 
2. Chargen Attack 
The UDP chargen service responds to a UDP echo request by sending a string of 
characters to the source of the request [RFC864].  An attacker can exploit this by 
spoofing the target’s IP address in a UDP echo request.  This request is sent to the 
chargen port on an intermediate system.  Receipt of the request will create a feedback 
loop between the intermediate and target systems, preventing either one from responding 
to legitimate requests.  This indirect-path attack results in indirect interference. 
3. ICMP Flooding (Smurf Attack)  
When a system receives an ICMP echo request, it will respond with an ICMP 
echo reply.  However, if the request is addressed to a network broadcast address, it will 
be forwarded to every host in that network, and each host will send an echo reply.  To 
take advantage of this, an attacker sends an ICMP echo request, with the target’s IP 
address forged as the source address, to a network broadcast address.  This intermediate 
victim will broadcast the echo request to all hosts in the network, and they will all send 
echo replies back to the (forged) source of the request.  Since one ICMP packet sent to 
the broadcast address will be multiplied into hundreds or thousands of packets sent to the 
target, flooding the intermediate broadcast address with echo requests can rapidly 
consume the bandwidth of the target’s upstream link. 
F. PROPOSED DOS COUNTERMEASURES 
1. Filtering 
There are two main types of filtering, ingress and egress, that can be effective 
against DoS attacks.  Ingress filtering refers to filters applied to traffic as it enters the 
Internet [RFC2827].  It is used to prevent IP address spoofing.  Only packets with 
routable source addresses that lie within the address range of a site are allowed to pass 
though the filter.  This type of filter does not completely prevent forged source addresses.  
An attacker can still use forged source addresses within the originating domain’s assigned 
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address range.  However, filters of this type make it easier to find the true source of 
packets with forged header information. 
Ingress filtering is one of the more effective means of preventing DoS attacks, 
since it stops the address spoofing most attack rely upon.  However, there are several 
limitations to this approach.  For ingress filters to be truly effective, they must be 
implemented by a large majority of Internet Service Providers (ISP’s).  This will be hard 
to achieve, since it requires service providers to implement controls that do not directly 
benefit them.  Additionally, ingress filtering does not affect packets with spoofed IP 
source addresses in the same range as those assigned to the network implementing the 
filter. 
Egress filtering is performed at the destination.  Filters are set up to drop 
malformed or unauthorized packets as they are received.  Egress filters are primarily used 
to prevent network interference attacks designed to exploit flaws in applications.  They 
are ineffective at preventing indirect DoS attacks, since these attacks generally use valid 
requests that cannot be blocked while maintaining service to legitimate users.  A victim 
could use an egress filter to block all traffic from the domains that spoofed packets 
originate from, but this would still cause a DoS to legitimate users in that network.  
Furthermore, dropping packets as they are received at the destination does not relieve 
congestion on the link between the target and its upstream router(s).   
2. IP Traceback 
IP Traceback is a method of determining the true source of a packet with a forged 
source address.  When it is implemented, Internet routers would randomly mark packets 
with their own IP address as the packet passes through them.  After receiving a sufficient 
number of marked packets, the victim would be able to determine the full or at least 
partial path taken by malicious packets.  Once the true source IP address was known, the 
victim could work directly with the ISP of the source to stop the attack.  The advantages 
of this defense are low processing overhead required for implementation, backwards 
compatibility with existing protocols (the marking can be placed in a field of the IP 
header), and the ability to determine the true source of malicious packets without active 
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cooperation from the administrator of every router through which the packets pass 
[LEE01, SAVAGE00]. 
There are several drawbacks to this countermeasure.  First, it does not provide a 
way to distinguish between valid traffic and malicious traffic, so valid traffic may be 
penalized.  Second, some minimum number of malicious packets from a source must be 
marked in order to trace the flow from that source.  A resourceful attacker could take 
advantage of this by limiting the number of packets sent from any individual 
compromised host.  Finally, IP Traceback does not provide any relief to the victim during 
an attack.  Until the victim can stop the flood of the malicious packets, the attack will be 
effective.  Stopping the flow requires cooperation from the ISP at each source of flooding 
traffic. 
3. Router Throttling 
Router throttling is a method of distributed flow control.  It is designed to reduce 
traffic destined for a specific host at a point several routers upstream of the aggregation 
point for receipt by the host [YAU01].  When a server is overloaded with traffic, it 
calculates a maximum permissible flow rate and sends this value to participating 
upstream routers.  The upstream routers limit traffic destined to the overloaded server 
based on the specified flow rate.  In some cases, upstream routers may pass the flow rate 
limits to other routers further upstream.  This countermeasure shifts the processing 
requirements for large amounts of traffic from the target server to routers with greater 
bandwidth and filtering capability.   
Router throttling relies on a large measure of cooperation from other systems.  It 
also requires the victim to have detailed information about the Internet architecture in 
order to know which routers to activate throttles on.  The number of upstream routers that 
must participate in the flow control can become very large, and each must incur the 
overhead of count ing how many packets they allow through to the receiver.  It also 
requires an authentication mechanism for the flow control messages.  Otherwise, an 
attacker could use the flow control messages to create a denial of service by setting up 
unauthorized throttles. 
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4. Distributed Filtering 
Distributed filtering is a means of filtering packets similar to ingress filtering.  A 
router agent that performs distributed filtering checks each packet to determine if its 
source address is valid based on the agent’s knowledge of the Internet topology.  For 
example, if a router receives a packet from host A on a link other than the one that traffic 
from A should arrive on, the packet will be dropped.  It has been shown that a number of 
these agents, installed on only 20% of the autonomous systems in the Internet, would be 
sufficient to prevent up to %96 of all DoS attacks, and allow the location of a source of a 
successful attack to be narrowed to a set of five domains [PARK01]. 
The problem with this type of defense is that it relies on detailed knowledge of the 
Internet topology.  Exchange of source routing information between routers imposes 
additional overhead and would require some type of authentication.  The required 
cooperation of 20% of the autonomous systems on the Internet is also negative.  
Additionally, this method does not filter traffic with spoofed IP addresses that are still 
within a valid range for a given domain.  If hosts A and B are both in the same domain, 
the countermeasure would be ineffective against packets sent from B but marked with 
A’s address.  Some type of ingress filtering would be required for attacks of this type.  
5. Drawbacks 
The main drawback shared by the above countermeasures is the need for 
cooperation from third-party routers or service providers.  Obtaining this cooperation 
may be difficult or impossible based on the provider’s unwillingness or inability to act, 
and linguistic and geographic barriers.  The inability to stop attacks in a timely manner, 
requirements for changes to network devices and protocols, processing overhead, and 
requirements for detailed knowledge of changing Internet topology make it unlikely that 
these solutions will be implemented in a widespread and effective manner.  
G. DOS ATTACKS IN A DIFFSERV ENVIRONMENT 
New types of DoS attacks will accompany implementation of the DiffServ model.  
The separation of traffic into distinct classes and policing traffic on a per client basis will 
make it easier for an attacker to target a specific subset of the traffic flowing between 
nodes.  Since resources for individual traffic classes will be limited, it may be easier to 
17 
exhaust resources available to those classes.  Furthermore, bandwidth limits imposed on 
sources in order to maintain QoS guarantees will impose an artificial bottleneck that 
attackers can exploit.  If the DiffServ network reduces the bandwidth available to best 
effort traffic in order to maintain service guarantees to other traffic, it may inadvertently 
facilitate a DoS attack against best effort traffic.  Service theft, the unauthorized use of 
guaranteed services, may also result in a denial of service to legitimate users of those 
services.  This section describes the effects that DiffServ implementation will have on the 
conduct of DoS attacks. 
If an attacker can compromise hosts or routers within the DiffServ domain, 
creation of a DoS network or direct interference for traffic flowing in the domain is 
trivial.  Similarly, an attacker could deny service to a client by compromising client 
systems.  Solutions to these types of attack are beyond the scope of this thesis.  This 
research focuses on a method of attack similar to the most common types of attacks 
employed in the current Internet. 
1. Attack Constraints  
Indirect interference through bandwidth consumption will be harder to 
accomplish if flood traffic must traverse a DiffServ domain, since packets from paying 
clients will receive preferential treatment.  Packets from unrecognized sources will be 
assigned a default code-point, and will not receive special treatment.  Valid packets will 
be less likely to be dropped and more likely to reach their destination in a timely manner 
because of the priority they receive over best-effort traffic.  Thus, implementation of 
DiffServ will inherently provide more DoS protection for traffic aggregation points.  
With servers less vulnerable, the overall effect will be a shift in the focus of DoS attacks 
away from traffic termination points and towards other points along the path. 
The point at which traffic enters a DoS domain is the next logical point of attack.  
If a DiffServ provider is to use finite resources to provide QoS guarantees to all clients, it 
must limit the amount of traffic individual clients may send.  The amount of traffic a 
client may receive premium service for is defined in the SLA with the DiffServ provider.  
Bandwidth limitations imposed by SLA enforcement will make the entry point of the 
DiffServ network the narrowest section of the path. 
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DiffServ domains only provide preferred service to recognized clients.  At the 
network layer, incoming packets are classified to receive preferential treatment if their 
source address matches the address associated with an existing SLA.  Consequently, DoS 
attacks will rely on spoofing the address of a valid DiffServ client to attack that client or 
the class of traffic associated with that client’s SLA.  This in turn requires that the 
attacker have some means of identifying the clients of a DiffServ provider.  Typically, 
this will be accomplished through installation of some type of traffic monitor or “sniffer” 
along the path from the client to the DiffServ domain. 
The DiffServ domain must be able to meter each client’s traffic in order to ensure 
client adherence to SLA’s with regard to usage amounts.  It is possible to distribute this 
metering across all ingress routers, or to process and store metering information in a 
central database.  However, it is assumed that this metering will not be distributed or 
managed in a centralized manner.  Instead, the DiffServ domain assigns a specific ingress 
router as the designated entry point for traffic from a given client.  This eliminates 
overhead associated with intra-domain metering communications.  It also allows the 
DiffServ domain to filter incoming traffic based on the router it arrives at.  Therefore, to 
conduct a successful attack, the attacker must not only spoof the address of a valid client, 
but it must ensure that flooding traffic arrives at the ingress router assigned to that client. 
In a wired network, if a client is only one hop away from the ingress router, the 
DiffServ domain will be able to filter traffic based not only on the incoming router, but 
also on the incoming link.  In this case, it will be impossible for an attacker to flood 
spoofed traffic using this client’s source address, since we have already stated that the 
client itself is not compromised.  It follows that no attack is possible unless the client is 
more than one hop away from its assigned ingress router.   
The above reasoning does not hold if the client’s connection to the ingress router 
is a wireless link.  In a wireless connection, the transmission medium itself is not secure.  
Even if a client is only one hop away from the ingress router, an attacker could inject 
malicious traffic with that client’s address, thus circumventing the interface filtering at 
the ingress router.  Use of wireless networks also simplifies covert collection of 
information about clients, since packets are broadcast into an unprotected medium. 
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2. Countermeasures 
DiffServ implementation will enable new methods for prevention of attacks 
without interfering with the effectiveness of existing countermeasures.  Current attacks 
rely on the inability of the target to determine the source of flooding, thereby preventing 
the flood from being stopped or effectively filtered upstream of the aggregation point.  
However, since QoS guarantees are only provided to paying clients, the DiffServ 
provider must maintain a database of clients in order to properly meter traffic and provide 
appropriate QoS.  The provider can use this data at ingress routers to quickly downgrade 
or drop packets marked with non-client source addresses.  Of course, an attacker could 
simply forge the source addresses of actual clients, so the router must have another means 
of filtering malicious traffic.  However, this requires the attacker to use addresses of hosts 
that the DiffServ provider knows are valid.  This is a key benefit, since having a valid 
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IV. DENIAL OF SERVICE COUNTERMEASURE 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
The majority of the assumptions made when developing this countermeasure were 
based upon the discussion in Chapter III, Section D.  To summarize, client traffic must 
follow a partial best effort path.  The attacker can observe the traffic, and direct some 
number of agents installed on compromised hosts to mimic the signature of the client’s 
packets.  These hosts then send a flood of traffic to the ingress router assigned to that 
client. 
One other assumption was necessary to define the environment in which the 
countermeasure would operate.  The bandwidth of the connection between the DiffServ 
client and provider is assumed to be greater than the combined bandwidth available to the 
attacker for flooding.  If this were not the case, the attacker would not have to use a new 
type of attack, but could simply conduct a traditional indirect DoS against either the 
provider or the client. 
B. IP AUTHENTICATION HEADER (AH) 
The Authentication Header extension to the IP protocol is used to provide 
connectionless integrity and data origin authentication for IP datagrams [RFC2402].  The 
sender “signs” individual packets using a shared secret key, a hashing algorithm, and 
portions of the data contained in the packet.  The receiver uses the same key and 
algorithm to verify the signature of the received packet.  If the IP header is included when 
calculating the signature, the receiver can authenticate the source address field of the 
message. 
It is possible for a receiver to determine the validity of a packet’s source address 
for 100% of IP AH packets received.  However, the per-packet cryptographic processing 
required for IP AH does not scale well, and may be too computationally intensive to 
implement while maintaining QoS guarantees.  Ingress routers would be required to 
verify the header of every packet received before they could decide whether or not to 
discard it.  Studies have shown that the maximum data rates of several widely used secure 
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hashing algorithms are not sufficient for use in high-speed networks [RFC1810, 
RIPEMD96]. 
Another drawback of IP AH is that it requires the insertion of an additional header 
section into each packet.  For small packets, such as those used for VoIP traffic, this 
additional header information represents a significant percentage of the overall size of the 
data packets.1  The increased size would result in greater transmission delays, and could 
adversely affect the QoS a DiffServ provider could guarantee.  For applications that use 
larger packets, such as UDP-based streaming video or audio, increasing the size of IP 
packets can result in fragmentation, which also negatively affects QoS. 
C. GOALS 
The goal of this research was to develop a DoS countermeasure that would be 
effective under the assumptions above.  To be acceptable, the countermeasure  
· must not require per-packet cryptographic processing, 
· must not rely on cooperation from third-party hosts or routers, 
· must not increase the likelihood of packet fragmentation, and 
· must have negligible or no effect on the provider’s ability to guarantee QoS. 
The goal was not to devise a solution that would guarantee authentication of 
100% of incoming packets or a zero loss rate for valid, in-profile traffic.  Some degree of 
loss was deemed acceptable in exchange for reduced processing overhead. 
D. CONCEPT 
The DoS countermeasure that was developed is a marking method that a client 
can use to make its packets readily distinguishable from traffic with forged headers in 
certain cases.  Supporting this design is a feedback mechanism through which a provider 
can notify a client when its traffic does not conform to the profile specified in its SLA. 
This thesis proposes a technique that will allow the ingress router of the DiffServ 
domain to distinguish valid packets from malicious ones based on signature.  A packet’s 
signature is defined as a combination of the source address field and one or more other 
                                                 
1 The minimum size of the AH header is 16 bytes; maximum size depends on the size of the encrypted 
packet and the AH options selected.  The size of a common VoIP packet (without AH) is 64 bytes. 
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fields in the IP header.  This method relies on the ability of the client to alter this 
signature.  Since it has been assumed that an attacker will be able to observe traffic 
flowing between the client and the DiffServ domain, and will be able to instruct the flood 
sources to mimic any changes to packet signatures that it observes, changing the headers 
once is insufficient.  Therefore, changes will be made on a periodic basis, and must be 
made faster than the attacker can duplicate them. 
Figure 3.1 is a time diagram showing the sequence of actions involved in the 
proposed countermeasure.  When the ingress router marks a packet that appears to 
originate from a DiffServ client as out-of profile, it will log the source and time (t1) of the 
drop.  When the rate of out-of-profile marking exceeds a pre-set threshold (t2), the router 
will send a feedback message (A) to the client.  Upon receipt (t3), the client will begin 
altering the signature of its packets.  The ingress router will use these alterations to 
identify valid packets.  It will drop all packets with an invalid signature.  Details of the 
individual actions taken by the client and DiffServ router are given below 
The router feedback to the client will consist of a router-generated seed key for an 
algorithm that generates a sequence of signatures.  The client and router will be able to 
independently calculate what the correct signature should be using this algorithm and the 
seed-key.  The algorithm can be well known as long as the seed key being used remains 
secret.  The seed key will be encrypted using a shared secret key and digitally signed.  A 
seed key is used to generate new signatures instead of the shared secret key to avoid 
compromising the secret key through overuse.  The digital signature provides 
authentication for the feedback message, so attackers will be unable to create a DoS by 
forging these messages.  Payload encryption is required since the attacker can monitor 
traffic flowing between the client and the DiffServ domain.  Since the algorithm for 
generating signature values is not secret, access to unencrypted seed keys would allow 
the attacker to change the signature of the attack packets as rapidly as the sender could, 
thus circumventing the countermeasure. 
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Figure 3.1.   Time sequence Diagram for DiffServ Countermeasure 
 
Upon receipt of a feedback message, the client will authenticate it, decrypt the 
payload, and use the seed key to calculate the sequence of signature values that it will 
use.  The client will immediately begin using the values in the designated fields of the IP 
headers of its packets.  It will switch to the next signature (Si) in the sequence at regular 
intervals denoted by W.  The attacker will not know what each new signature is until it 
receives the information from the monitor installed along the path of the client traffic (B).  
When it knows the new signature, it can direct the flood sources to change the signatures 
they are using (C).  The time between when the ingress router receives the first valid 
































signature, denoted by d, is the window in which 100% authentication is possible.  The 
importance of the relative values of d and W are discussed in Section D. 
The seed key is also used to create the same sequence of signature values at the 
router.  After sending a feedback message, the router will treat all packets as valid until it 
receives the first packet with the first altered signature.  All successive packets with an 
incorrect signature are dropped, except the first packet received with the second 
signature.  When the first packet with the second signature is received, the router will 
drop all successive packets that do not match the second signature, including those 
marked with the first signature.  This prevents an attacker from using old signatures to 
circumvent the DoS countermeasures. 
E. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE 
The main performance metric of interest is the client’s packet out-of-profile rate, 
i.e., the percentage of the DiffServ client’s packets being marked out of profile at the 
ingress router.  A DoS countermeasure is considered more effective than another is if it 
achieves a smaller packet out-of-profile rate for the client given the same network setup 
and attack scenario.  An analytical model of the feedback mechanism was created using a 
set of simplifying assumptions.  From this model a closed form solution for the DiffServ 
client’s packet out-of-profile rate was derived. 
Denote the percentage of the client’s packets being marked out of profile at the 
ingress router by p.  In order to derive p, the following additional assumptions were 
made: 
1) All client and attack packets are the same size.  
2) The client’s traffic arrives at the ingress router at a constant rate of r packets 
per second, which is less than or equal to CIR, the client’s committed 
information rate in packets per second. 
3) The attack traffic arrives at the ingress router at a constant rate of A packets 
per second such that  
CIRAr ³+ .    (1) 
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4) The client traffic switches to a new signature every W seconds.  The attack 
traffic tries to make the same signature change, but the change always 
happens  d seconds later from the ingress router’s perspective.  In other words, 
there is a fixed lag of d between the arrival time at the ingress of the first valid 
packet with a new signature and the arrival time of the first attack packet with 
the same signature. 
5) The ingress router’s traffic metering process for the client is fair so that if the 
traffic being metered is made of several flows, each flow will be ensured of a 
share of in-profile packets that is proportion to the flow’s packet arrival rate. 
Consider the time window for an arbitrary signature used by the client’s traffic.  
There are two cases:  
Case 1: .dW £   From assumption 4, during the entire time period, every attack packet 
carries an expired signature when inspected by the ingress router.  Such packets will be 
dropped before being counted against the client’s committed rate in the metering process.  
From assumption 2, the rate of the valid traffic alone does not exceed the committed rate.  
Thus, we have .0=p  
Case 2: .dW >  From assumption 4, during an initial time period equal to d, the ingress 
router will be able to drop all attack packets.  However, for the remaining time dW - , 
the ingress router will not be able to distinguish valid traffic from attack traffic because 
they have the same signature.  In that case, some of the client’s packets will be marked 
out-of-profile.  From assumption 5 and equation (2), the percentage of client packets 
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Dividing equation (5) by the total number of packets sent by the client during the entire 










= .    (6) 
It can be shown via a similar derivation that 0p , the packet out-of-profile rate for 
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Using equation (7), we rewrite equation (5) as: 
0)1( pW
d
p ´-= .     (8) 
Equation (8) clearly indicates that the reduction in the packet out-of-profile rate due to 
the feedback mechanism is inversely proportional to W, the period between signature 
changes by the client. 
Combining both cases results in the following theorem: 
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F. WEAKNESSES 
A rudimentary implementation of this countermeasure would nave several weak 
points.  This section discusses several known weaknesses of the DoS countermeasure and 
possible solutions. 
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1. Size of Signature Space 
One weakness is based on the size of the signature space, which is defined as the 
combined total number of bits in the IP header fields used as the signature.  If the 
signature space is small, an attacker can launch an attack such that packets containing 
every possible signature are sent to the DiffServ ingress router during any given signature 
window W.  As a result, the ingress router will receive attack packets with signatures 
matching the next expected signature before the client has switched to that signature.  
Processing these packets will trigger a premature signature change.  The resulting 
signature asynchrony between the client traffic and the ingress router will cause all future 
client packets to be dropped by the DoS countermeasure.  This is a more effective DoS 
than if the countermeasure was not in use. 
Even if the signature space is sufficiently large, an attacker may be able to send 
enough packets with different signatures to increase the statistical likelihood that one of 
them will have the correct next signature.  To counter this, the client can also use the 
feedback mechanism  
2. Path Variations  
The client’s ability to change its signature faster than an attacker can duplicate the 
changes is not guaranteed.  It may be possible for attack traffic with the next signature to 
arrive at the ingress router faster than valid traffic with the same signature.  As stated 
above, d depends on the difference in the ingress router arrival times of valid and invalid 
packets with the same signature.  If the difference is equal to zero, then from the ingress 
router’s point of view, the attacker can match the signature changes as fast as or faster 
than the client can make them and the countermeasure is useless.  If the difference is 
negative (i.e. attack packets arrive faster than valid packets), the countermeasure actually 
aids the attacker, since valid packets with the previous signature will be dropped after 
receipt of the first attack packet with the new signature. 
3. Traffic Re-ordering 
If valid traffic is re-ordered at some point before reaching the ingress router, the 
countermeasure may have an adverse effect on valid traffic.  A packet containing a new 
signature that is received out of order, i.e. ahead of packets with the old signature, will 
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cause in-transit packets with the old signature to be dropped.  This can be remedied by 
delaying the expiration of old code-points.  The length of the delay can be based on the 
mean propagation delay incurred by client traffic as observed by the ingress router.  
However, this remedy reduces the effective period of the countermeasure, since flooding 
traffic with the old signature will also be accepted during the overlap period. 
4. Fairness 
The countermeasure may disproportionately drop packets from certain sub-flows 
within the clients traffic.  Recall the steps for deriving the client’s out-of-profile rate.  If 
W is a constant and if W is larger than d, the DoS countermeasure creates periodic DoS 
effective time intervals as illustrated in Figure 4.1.  During these time intervals, the 
countermeasure is ineffective and the DoS attack causes high packet out-of-profile rates 
for the client.  If one of the client’s sub-flows generates packets periodically, it is possible 
that the flow started during a DoS effective interval and its packet generation period is 
similar to W.  In such a case, that sub-flow’s packets always arrive at the ingress during 
DoS effective periods, resulting a disproportionately high out-of-profile rate for the sub-
flow.  
 
Figure 4.1.   Periodic DoS Effectiveness 
 
Therefore, the DoS countermeasure may not all sub-flows equally or fairly.  One 







of this fix and other solutions to enhance the fairness of the countermeasure in our 
follow-on work 
 
G. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS: DETECTION OF SERVICE THEFT 
A service theft can be defined as a course of actions taken by a perpetrator to use 
a portion of a valid client’s allocated bandwidth and obtain a premium service without 
pay.  An intruder may attempt to blend its unauthorized traffic in with valid traffic by 
studying the client’s traffic pattern and adjusting his own traffic volume over time so that 
the ingress router would never mark an excessive number of packets out of profile.  
Unlike a DoS attack, the perpetrator is typically much more restrained to avoid drawing 
attention to himself.  Therefore, a service theft usually does not cause as much direct 
harm to the client as a DoS attack.  However, service theft results in lost revenue and 
network availability for the DiffServ provider. 
The proposed feedback mechanism and the resulting cooperation between the 
client and the ingress router may help the service provider detect service theft.  For 
example, the ingress router may activate the feedback mechanism randomly, regardless 
of whether or not it has just marked a large number of packets out of profile for the client.  
If a service theft is under way, the ingress router should notice two or more signatures 
being frequently used at the same time.  When this occurs, the ingress router may log the 
event as a possible occurrence of service theft or immediately alert the network operator 
to perform further investigation.  Use of a random signature time window (W) would 
prevent the perpetrator from predicting how much longer a spoofed signature would be 
valid and adjusting its traffic pattern accordingly.   
If the intruder can monitor feedback messages from the ingress router, he can 
evade the ingress router’s service theft detection by suspending his flooding traffic 
whenever a feedback message is observed.  In this case, the proposed theft detection 
mechanism may not be able to catch a more resourceful intruder.  However, it will be 
sufficient to stop the service theft from continuing, and more importantly, it will deter 
future service theft by forcing the intruder to expend more resources and effort to avoid 
detection.  
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The general conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that the 
proposed DoS countermeasure may be extended into an auditing function that is 
orthogonal to access control.  For example, it may be used to supplement some other DoS 
countermeasure by detecting service theft or cases where the authentication process of the 
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V. SIMULATION 
A. NS2 NETWORK SIMULATOR 
The experiments were conducted using version 2.1b8a of ns2, a discrete event 
simulator targeted at networking research [NS02].  The following description of the 
simulator is given in The ns Manual: 
ns is an object-oriented simulator, written in C++, with an OTcl interpreter 
as a front end.  The simulator supports a class hierarchy (also called the 
compiled hierarchy …), and a similar class hierarchy within the OTcl 
interpreter (also called the interpreted hierarchy …).  The two hierarchies 
are closely related to each other; from the user’s perspective, there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between a class in the interpreted hierarchy 
and one in the compiled hierarchy. … Users created new simulator objects 
through the interpreter; these objects are instantiated within the interpreter, 
and are closely mirrored by a corresponding object in the compiled 
hierarchy. [FALL02] 
The simulator includes a DiffServ module with implementations of distinct core and edge 
routers, several marking policies and queuing disciplines, and built- in tracing for 
DiffServ queues. 
The remaining material covered in this section is drawn from the detailed 
description of ns2 in [FALL02].  In the remainder of this thesis, names of objects and 
functions in the compiled (C++) hierarchy are in Courier bold.  Names of objects 
and functions in the interpreted (OTcl) hierarchy are in italics.  By convention in ns, 
subclasses are denoted by specifying the name of the parent class followed by a forward 
slash and the name of the subclass.  For example, Agent/UDP is a subclass of Agent, and 
Agent/UDP/Sniffer is a subclass of Agent/UDP. 
1. Interpreted Objects 
The simulator is configured using OTcl scripts to define the parameters of 
network devices and interrelationships between them.  Objects in the script are 
instantiated in the compiled and interpreted hierarchies when the simulator is initialized 
at run time.  This subsection describes the OTcl objects necessary to construct and run an 
ns2 simulation. 
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Most scripts begin by instantiating a Simulator object, which represents an 
instance of the ns2 simulator.  This object provides interfaces for simulator configuration 
and for setting up the type of event scheduler to be used.  To instantiate simulator objects 
and configure other aspects of the simulation, various methods of the class Simulator are 
called. 
Node objects represent network hosts and routers.  A Node’s address may be 
assigned automatically or manually.  Unicast nodes contain two Classifier objects, which 
determine how packets are forwarded.  The address classifier determines whether a 
packet is addressed to the node.  If it is not, the packet is passed to the appropriate Link 
object, as determined by the routing algorithm, for forwarding.  If the packet is addressed 
to the node, it is passed to the node’s port classifier.  The port classifier passes the packet 
to the Agent object attached to the port specified in the packet’s header. 
A Link object connects two nodes and contains the mechanisms for simulating 
packet queues and propagation delays.  Links may be unidirectional (simplex-link) or bi-
directional (duplex-link).  Every link has a Queue object associated with each traffic flow 
direction.  A queue is the location where packets are stored until they can be forwarded to 
the link’s destination node.  The simulator provides a number of disciplines for queue 
management and scheduling. 
Agent objects are used to implement network protocols or services.  Agents are 
attached to nodes on a specific port, and they receive all traffic destined for that port.  
Similarly, they are the source of packets originating from that port.  Agents may manage 
packets based on native code, or they may have an attached Application object that 
determines how outgoing packets are generated and incoming packets are processed. 
Two agents can be linked using the connect command.  This designates each 
agent as the destination for traffic from the other agent.  When one of the linked agents 
creates a packet, the destination address is automatically set to the address of the other 
agent.  The Agent subclass Null implements a sink for traffic that requires no processing 
at the destination.   
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The Simulator, Node, Queue, Agent, and Application classes are mirrored in the 
C++ hierarchy by classes of the same name.  The Link class exists only in the OTcl 
hierarchy. 
2. Compiled Objects 
The exchange of references to Packet objects between simulator objects is used to 
simulate packet flow in the simulator.  The user can specifically choose which protocol-
specific headers are included in simulation packets, e.g. TCP, UDP, TELNET, and ARP.  
By default, every Packet object includes the structures for every protocol-specific header 
defined in ns2.  New header structures can be added by defining a C++ structure with the 
required fields, creating an OTcl linkage for the structure, and modifying the simulator 
initialization code to include the new header.  Class Packet is not mirrored in the OTcl 
hierarchy, since individual packets are not accessed in the interpreter. 
The struct ns_addr_t is defined in the file config.h, which resides in the ns-
2.1b8a subdirectory of the main ns2 directory.  This struct is a container for an address 
and port number pair.  It is used to correctly route traffic to or identify traffic from the 
Agent residing at the given port on the Node with the given address. 
The abstract base class TimerHandler provides the C++ means of scheduling 
future events.  This class is also not mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy.  Classes derived from 
TimerHandler must define the pure virtual function expire().  This function 
definition is the action that will be taken when the event is executed.  Based on the input 
parameter they receive, the sched() and resched() functions will schedule an event 
a certain number of seconds into the future.  At the scheduled time for the event, the 
simulation calls the expire() function, which executes the event.  The user can 
schedule a recurring event by calling the resched() function inside the expire() 
function. 
3. DiffServ Implementation 
The DiffServ module in ns2 allows the user to define a number of different 
behavior aggregates and their associated PHBs.  Packets arriving at an ingress point are 
marked with the code-point associated with their behavior aggregate.  DiffServ routers 
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provide varying QoS by applying different forwarding treatment to each aggregate.  
DiffServ objects also automatically maintain records of dropped packets. 
DiffServ routers in ns2 use Multiple Random Early Detection (MRED) for 
queuing management.  RED is designed to prevent overflow by randomly dropping 
packets when a queue’s usage exceeds a certain percentage of its maximum capacity.  
MRED applies a RED algorithm to a group of queues, but the drop probability for traffic 
assigned to an individual queue may be affected by the average length of all queues in the 
group. 
The class dsREDQueue is derived from class Queue.  It provides a single 
DiffServ router the functionality to handle multiple RED queues on a single link.  Two 
classes representing DiffServ edge (ingress) and core routers, edgeQueue and 
coreQueue, are derived from dsREDQueue.  They are mirrored in the interpreted 
hierarchy as Queue/dsRED/edge and Queue/dsRED/core, respectively. 
The class Policy provides the functionality to police traffic into different 
aggregates.  It also maintains a policy table with the parameters for each source and 
destination pair.  The mark() function assigns an initial code-point to the arriving 
packets of a flow based on their source and destination addresses, and then calls the 
policer via the applyPolicy() function.  The policy modules currently implemented 
in the DiffServ module are Time Sliding Window with Two or Three Color Marking, 
Single or Two Rate Three Color Marking, and Token Bucket.  The experiments 
conducted for this research used the Token Bucket policer, which is covered in detail 
below.  The policer may downgrade the initial code-point to a secondary or tertiary code-
point based on the state information maintained in the policy table for the flow.  
The Token Bucket policer increments the policy’s cBucket state variable 
according to the elapsed time since the arrival of the last packet.  The variable cBucket 
is incremented at a rate equal to the policy’s CIR, but is capped at an upper bound equal 
to the policy’s committed burst size (CBS).  If the arriving packet’s size is less than or 
equal to cBucket, cBucket is decremented by the packet size and the packet retains 
its initial code-point.  Otherwise, the packet’s code-point is downgraded to the secondary 
code-point. 
37 
B. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The DoS countermeasure was designed to require a minimum number of changes 
to existing ns2 files.  When possible, existing C++ classes were extended to add new 
functionality.  In all cases where this was not feasible, backwards compatibility was 
maintained with the version of ns2 being modified.  This was accomplished by adding 
new functions that are called only by code associated with the countermeasure, or by use 
of conditional statements that are executed only if the DiffServ module is installed.  
Existing lines of code were not modified. 
Since OTcl procedures do not need to be defined in the same file as their parent 
classes, new OTcl procedures were added in a separate file, and the compiler was 
reconfigured to include this file during building of the ns2 executable. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
Simulation of the DoS attack and countermeasure was implemented through 
modification of existing ns2 classes or by creation of new classes.  This section describes 
the changes and additions to the simulator.  The code for these changes can be found in 
Appendices A and B.  
1. Simulator Extensions  
The following classes were added to the ns2 Simulator.  They provide the 
methods and objects necessary to store information about the feedback process, to 
communicate between the DiffServ client and provider, and to create a simulated network 
topology based on the constraints described in Chapters III and IV. 
a. Class dsFeedback 
The DoS countermeasure is primarily implemented in class 
dsFeedback.  All members of this class are static, which allows other classes to access 
them without instantiating the parent class, and insures that only one state information 
database exists.  Member functions of this class enable database access and modification; 
generate code-points used by the countermeasure; and initiate of feedback messages. 
Class dsFeedback maintains a state information database for each 
source and destination pair seen by the ingress router.  The upper level of the database is 
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a C++ Standard Template Library (STL) map.  This map pairs each source address with a 
second map object.  The second map pairs destination addresses with objects of class 
FeedbackInfo.  Each FeedbackInfo object contains the state information for the 
specified source and destination pair.  The state information includes 
· an STL deque of packet drop times, 
· a flag indicating whether the countermeasure is running or not, 
· the current and next code-points to be used by the source, 
· the length of the key window, and 
· the parameters which determine the drop rate which, if exceeded, will 
result in a feedback message  
Class IcmpAgent is declared as a friend of class dsFeedback.  This 
allows it to access the private member variable secretKey.  This variable represents 
the shared secret required for authentication and decryption of feedback messages, and 
code-point sequence generation. 
The source code for classes dsFeeback and FeedbackInfo is in the 
files dsFeedback.{h,cc}, which are in the /ns-2.1b8a/diffserv directory.  These classes are 
not mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy. 
b. Class IcmpAgent 
The IcmpAgent class is derived from class Agent.  It provides the 
mechanisms for sending feedback messages and scheduling client code-point  changes.  
The struct hdr_icmp defines the ns2 header associated with ICMP agents.  It contains 
information about the source of a dropped packet, the seed key to be used to generate the 
code-point sequence, and the code-point window to be used by the client. 
The member function send() overrides the version in the parent class.  
The ingress router calls this function when the drop rate exceeds the threshold.  The 
function creates a new packet, assigns the appropriate value to the fields in the ICMP 
header, and sends this feedback packet to an ICMP agent attached to the source of the 
dropped packets. 
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The member function recv() also overrides the implementation in the 
parent class.  It is called when the parent node of the ICMP agent receives a feedback 
packet.  The function uses information in the packet’s header to configure and start the 
DoS countermeasure. 
Each ICMP agent contains an instance of class CodePtTimer, a timer 
derived from TimerHandler.  The expire() function of CodePtTimer calls the 
static generateNextCodePt() function of class dsFeeback and then reschedules 
itself based on the code-point window specified in the feedback packet from the ingress 
router. 
The source code for classes IcmpAgent and CodePtTimer, and the 
hdr_icmp struct may be found in the /ns-2.1b8a/diffserv directory in files icmp.{h,cc}.  
IcmpAgent is mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy as class Agent/Icmp. 
c. Class SnifferAgent 
The class SnifferAgent is used to simulate a monitor installed along 
the path of traffic coming from the client gateway.  This class is derived from the existing 
UDPAgent class, and is mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy as class Agent/UDP/Sniffer.  The 
member variable controller is a reference to a ControlAgent object attached to 
a separate node in the network.  This other node is the location of the attack controller.  
Whenever the source being sniffed sends a packet with a changed code-point, an 
additional packet is sent to the agent that controller refers to.  This simulates the 
ability of the attack controller to monitor traffic from the source and ‘see’ code-point 
changes.  The source code for SnifferAgent is contained in /ns-
2.1b8a/diffserv/sniffer.{h,cc}. 
d. Class ControlAgent 
This class is also derived from UDPAgent, and is mirrored as 
Agent/UDP/Controller.  It simulates the DoS attack controller.  The member variable 
floodList is a reference to a list of flooding sources.  The overridden function 
recv() examines the code-point in packets sent from a SnifferAgent and changes 
the code-point used by attack traffic to match it.   
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Due to problems encountered with spoofing addresses in the simulator, 
changes to the code-point used by the compromised hosts could not be made by sending a 
packet containing the new code-point from the controller to the flood source.  Instead, the 
code-point used by the flood sources was directly manipulated by the attack controller.  
This introduced an artificial acceleration of the attackers ability to mimic the clients 
code-point changes, since queuing, transmission, and propagation delays between the 
controller and flooder were eliminated.  However, the validity of the simulation was 
maintained by increasing these delays between the flooding sources and the DiffServ 
ingress router in the simulation script.  The source code for ControlAgent is 
contained in /ns-2.1b8a/diffserv/attack-controller.{h,cc}. 
e. Class FloodAgent 
This class simulates the flooding sources controlled by an attacker.  It is 
derived from UDPAgent.  The ability to alter the code-point in use upon receipt of a 
packet from the attack controller was implemented, but was not used for reasons 
discussed in the section on ControlAgent.  The source code for FloodAgent is 
contained in /ns-2.1b8a/diffserv/zombie.{h,cc}.2 
f. OTcl Procedures 
Addition of three OTcl procedures was necessary to allow the exchange of 
certain data between the compiled and interpreted hierarchies.  These procedures are 
located in the file /ns-2.1b8a/tcl/lib/ns-diffserv.tcl.  The procedures prio and set_priority 
were added to class Agent to allow the user to view and modify an agent’s code-point for 
debugging purposes.  The procedure get-agent-handle was added to the ICMP agent class 
(Agent/ICMP).  It takes a port number as an argument and returns a reference to the agent 
attached to that port.  The procedure allows an ICMP agent in the C++ hierarchy to 
obtain a reference to another agent attached to the same node. 
2. Simulator Modifications  
The following existing ns2 files were modified to implement functions necessary 
for either creating the attack scenario described in Chapter III or implementing the DoS 
                                                 
2 For consistency with the thesis text, simulator files zombie.{h,cc} are renamed flood.{h,cc} in the 
appendices, and the word “zombie” has been globally replaced with the word “flood” 
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countermeasure described in Chapter IV.  Modifications to existing files can be found 
quickly by searching for the flag “[FEEDBACK]”. 
a. Class dsred 
The class dsred simulates queue objects in DiffServ enabled routers.  
This class is mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy as class Queue/dsRED.  It contains a struct 
stats, which stores data about the number of packets dropped.  The enque() function  
of this class takes a Packet object as an argument and queues or drops it based on the 
algorithm chosen by the user during configuration of the simulator.3 
The member variable drops_FB was added to the stats struct to allow 
tracking of the number of packets dropped by the DoS countermeasure.  The enque() 
function was modified in two ways.  First, prior to performing any metering, incoming 
packets are checked to see if they are marked with an invalid code-point.  If the code-
point is invalid, drops_FB is incremented, and the packet is dropped without further 
processing.  Otherwise, the packet is processed by the pre-existing code.  The second 
change was inserted just prior to the points at which packets are dropped during normal 
processing.  The simulator checks to see if the countermeasure is active at the source of a 
packet about to be dropped.  This is done to ensure that no excess overhead is incurred by 
sending feedback messages to a source that is already running the countermeasure.  If the 
countermeasure is not active, the record of drops for that packet’s flow is updated in 
dsFeedback::feedbackTable. 
b. Class dsPolicy 
The class dsPolicy performs the metering functions of the DiffServ 
ingress routers.  It is not mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy.  The mark() member function 
of this class uses the meter and parameters specified by the user to set the code-points of 
packets arriving at the router.  The mark() function was modified to call the 
dsFeedback::isCodePtValid() function prior to executing the existing code.  
Packets with invalid code-points are reassigned the code-point 
                                                 
3 Choices for the queuing algorithm are drop tail, RIO C, RIO D, or WRED.  A description of each can 
be found in the ns2 users manual [FALL02]. 
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dsFeedback::INVALID_CP, and this code-point is also returned to the calling 
function.  Packets with valid code-points are handled by the pre-existing code. 
c. Class Agent 
The class Agent is the base class for all simulator agents.  It is mirrored 
in the OTcl hierarchy as class Agent.  The Agent protected member variable prio_ 
represents the IP ToS field.  The public member function set_priority() was added 
to allow modification of prio_ outside of the Agent class. 
d. Class Packet 
The class Packet stores a list of the headers included in a packet object 
in ns2.  It is not mirrored in the OTcl hierarchy.  The list was modified to include the 
header associated with the IcmpAgent class. 
e. OTcl Packet Configuration 
The file /ns-2.1b8a/tcl/lib/ns-packet.tcl contains the code necessary to 
enable and disable individual packet headers from within an OTcl script, as discussed in 
Chapter IV.  This file was modified to include the header defined for use with the new 
ICMP protocol. 
f. OTcl Default Parameters 
The file /ns-2.1b8a/tcl/lib/ns-default.tcl stores default parameters that are 
assigned to OTcl objects when they are instantiated.  The default value for ICMP packet 
size was added to this file. 
g. Compilation Environment 
The files Makefile.in and ns- lib.tcl are used when building the ns2 
executable.  Makefile.in describes the dependencies among the ns2 source files and 
contains the commands necessary to update the ns2 executable file.  The location and 
names of all new C++ and OTcl files were added to this file.  The names and locations of 
OTcl files that must be compiled into the executable are contained in ns-lib.tcl.  This file 
was updated to include the file ns-diffserv.tcl. 
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VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Figure 6.1 shows the ns2 topology that was used to conduct experiments.  The 
OTcl script that sets up this topology is contained in Appendix C.  All hosts and 
intermediate routers are basic Node objects.  All links external to the DiffServ domain 
consist of duplex Link objects with default Queues.  Within the DiffServ domain, 
connections between ingress and core routers consist of two simplex Link objects.  The 
links from ingress to core routers use dsRED/edge queue objects.  The queue at the 
ingress router uses a Token Bucket policer to assign code points to incoming packets.  
The links from core to ingress routers use dsRED/core queue objects. 
One Sniffer and one Icmp agent were attached to the client gateway node.  The 
Sniffer agent was connected to a Null agent attached to the destination node.  The Icmp 
agent was connected to a second Icmp agent attached to the ingress router node.  An 
application that generated constant bit-rate (CBR) traffic (class Application/Traffic/CBR) 
was attached to the Sniffer 
 
Figure 6.1.   Experimental Network Topology 
 
One control agent was attached to the attack controller node.  A reference to this 


















each flood source node, and each flooding agent was connected to the null agent installed 
on the destination node.  References to the agents were stored in the list maintained by 
the control agent.  The addresses of the flooding nodes were manually changed to match 
the address of the client gateway in order to simulate the spoofing of source addresses. 
For all simulations, the client and flood sources were set to transmit fixed sized 
packets at a constant bit rate.  A small degree of random variation in packet inter-
departure times was introduced to eliminate synchronization of packet arrival at the 
ingress router.  Link bandwidths were held constant, and were assigned values large 
enough to prevent queues from overflowing. 
In Figure 6.1, the times t , tA , tC , and tF represent the sum of all processing, 
queuing, transmission, and propagation delays incurred by a packet transiting the 
respective link.  We observe that the difference in arrival times at the ingress router of the 
first valid and invalid packets with the same signature, which we have previously named 
d, can be written  
( ) ttttd FCA -++= .     (11) 
As explained in Chapter V, Section B, the attack controller directly accesses the 
flood sources to update code points, thus eliminating the delays on the links between 
them.  For this topology, this is equivalent to setting tC equal to zero.  However, this 
artificiality can be corrected by increasing the delay assigned to either tA, tF, or both, such 
that the sum of tA , tC , and tF represents the total time required for the flow of attack 
packets with a new signature to merge with valid flows with the same signature. 
After examining the IP header format, the Type of Service (ToS) field in the IP 
header was chosen as the mutable portion of the packet signature in our simulation.  This 
field is already included in the simulation’s IP header implementation, so no 
modifications to the header were required.  The ToS field is unused in the non-DiffServ 
routers between the client and the DiffServ provider, so modifying it at the source will 
not affect packet routing outside of the DiffServ domain. 4.  DiffServ ingress routers 
change this field after receipt based on the client’s SLA, so modifying it will not affect 
                                                 
4 In practice, this field would not be used exclusively, since it may be used in transit by networks that 
implement IP Precedence [RFC791]. 
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routing within the DS domain.  In the remainder of this section, the term signature refers 
specifically to the combination of IP source address and IP ToS field.  However, other 
fields such as ID or Options could be used in place of or in combination with the ToS 
field to determine packet signature. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In our first set of experiments, we compared the out-of-profile rate produced in 
the simulation to that calculated using Equation (9).  Runs were conducted for several 
different values of p0.  The values of W, and p0 were held constant during each run.  The 
value of d was manipulated by varying tA while holding tC, tF, and t constant.  The results 
of these trials are shown in Figure 6.2.   
Figure 6.2.   Predicted Out-of-Profile Rates vs. Measured Results 
 
The second set of experiments was conducted to determine the effect on the DoS 
countermeasure of changing the bucket size for the Token Bucket policer.  In each run, 
the values of W, d, and p0 were held constant.  The size of the token bucket was increased 
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exponentially until it was large enough to prevent any packets from being dropped 
regardless of their true source.  Runs were conducted for cases in which W>d and W<d.  
The results are plotted in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3.   Effect of Token Bucket Size on Out-of Profile Rate 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
For the first experiment, the simulated results correlated well with the predicted 
results.  For cases in which W was greater than d but the difference between them was 
small, the countermeasure was effective in limiting the out-of-profile rate for valid 
packets.  When W >> d, the out-of-profile rate for valid packets approached p0.  In test 
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Results of the second experiment indicate that for our countermeasure, a small 
token bucket size is required to minimize out-of-profile marking for valid traffic while 
maximizing it for invalid traffic.  Bucket sizes that were two to four times the average 
packet size provided the best results.  However, the result of failure to use a small bucket 
size was only slight degradation in the overall performance of the countermeasure. 
The out-of-profile marking rate for valid traffic is higher than predicted if the 
token bucket size is not optimized.  For extremely small token bucket sizes, this is 
expected.  The token bucket allows the maximum arrival rate a router will tolerate for 
short periods to be larger than the average long-term rate.  If the bucket size is small (less 
than twice the size of an average packet), the randomness introduced into inter-packet 
departure times can cause two successive packets to be received at a rate that exceeds the 
maximum arrival rate.  
The observed effectiveness of the countermeasure was also worse than predicted 
for large bucket sizes.  This can be attributed to the longer delay in starting the 
countermeasure that logically accompanies a larger token bucket.  The ingress router will 
treat the initial flood of traffic as a burst.  A larger bucket allows larger bursts, so under 





























DiffServ implementation will have a significant impact on the conduct and 
mitigation of DoS attacks.  The explicit bond between a service provider and its clients 
will allow communication that is difficult to achieve in the current Internet.  This 
research has demonstrated that it is possible to mitigate DoS attacks against DiffServ 
clients and detect service theft without per-packet cryptographic processing.  The tradeoff 
for the reduction in overhead is the potential inability to guarantee a zero loss rate for 
valid traffic entering the DiffServ domain.  The proposed countermeasure can be 
combined with other security protocols if both QoS and security are required.  Its low 
cost in terms of processing requirements makes it an excellent choice as an independent 
monitor for possible breaches of the security protocols. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The countermeasure and its implementation in ns2 are both in nascent stages of 
development.  The following areas provide opportunities to extend and improve upon the 
work of this thesis. 
1. Countermeasure Hardening 
The proposed countermeasure has been exhaustively analyzed to ensure security.  
However, it has several known weaknesses (see Chapter IV) and additional weaknesses 
may be discovered in the future.  The countermeasure must be refined to secure it against 
these weaknesses, and continually re-examined in light of changes to network devices 
and protocols.  Solutions to known weaknesses must be implemented and their effects on 
the effectiveness of the countermeasure studied. 
2. Realism Improvements 
Simulations using more realistic traffic sources and network topologies must be 
run to allow further validation and study of the DoS countermeasure.  DiffServ client 
traffic was simulated by a CBR traffic source.  This type of source is does not accurately 
model real-world network traffic, which tends to have greater variance in burst size and 
inter-burst timing.  Simulations should be run using various traffic distributions, e.g. 
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exponential or Pareto distributions, to examine the performance of the countermeasure 
under more realistic traffic loads.  Exponential and Pareto traffic generation applications 
are implemented in the simulator.  However, they could not be evaluated due to 
synchronization effects observed at the DiffServ ingress router when using them.  
Additional study is required to tune these applications and eliminate synchronization. 
3. Evaluation of Fairness 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the fairness of the countermeasure with respect to 
individual flows has not been determined.  A single traffic source was used to simulate 
client traffic.  Follow-on work should be undertaken to create a simulation topology in 
which traffic from a number of different hosts is aggregated at the client gateway before 
exiting the client’s domain.  Modifications to the countermeasure should be developed to 
correct any inequities observed in the treatment of individual sub-flows of the aggregated 
traffic. 
A topology for testing the fairness of the countermeasure can be implemented 
with only minor modifications to the simulator.  The simulator provides implementations 
for protocols that are likely to be used for traffic requiring QoS guarantees.  One example 
is the class Agent/RTP, which simulates the Real Time Protocol.  A topology could be 
created in which a number of RTP agents in a client domain are provided QoS based on a 
single SLA between the client domain and the DiffServ domain.  This would require all 
agents to send their traffic to a single client gateway, where the traffic would be 
aggregated and forwarded to the DiffServ network.  Implementing the gateway requires 
creation of a new Agent subclass capable of perfo rming these functions. 
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APPENDIX A. SOURCE CODE FOR DOS COUNTERMEASURE 
EXTENSIONS TO THE NS2 SIMULATOR 
When the file ns-allinone-2.1b8a.tar is expanded, the main ns2 directory is 
created with the same name (without the .tar extension).  Files listed in this  appendix 
were added to the existing /ns2.1b8a/diffserv subdirectory of the main ns2 directory, with 









class FloodNode { 
public: 
   FloodNode(); 
   FloodAgent* agent; 




class ControlAgent : public UdpAgent { 
public: 
  ControlAgent(); 
  ControlAgent(packet_t type); 
  int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
  void recv(Packet* p, Handler* h); 
  inline ns_addr_t here() { return here_;}; //for use by sniffer agent 
 
private: 













//a linked list of the flood agents controlled by this node 
FloodNode::FloodNode() { 
  agent = NULL; 




static class ControlClass : public TclClass { 
public: 
    ControlClass() : TclClass("Agent/UDP/Controller") {} 
    TclObject* create(int, const char*const*) { 
        return (new ControlAgent()); 




ControlAgent::ControlAgent() : UdpAgent() { 
        floodList = NULL; 




ControlAgent::ControlAgent(packet_t type) : UdpAgent(type) { 
        floodList = NULL; 




int ControlAgent::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) { 
  Agent* srcAgent = NULL; 
 
  if (argc == 3) { 
 
    //implementation of tcl command "add-flooder" 
    if (strcmp(argv[1], "add-flooder") == 0) { 
      FloodAgent* newAgent = (FloodAgent*) TclObject::lookup(argv[2]); 
 
      if (newAgent) { 
        //in case feedback has already started 
        newAgent->set_priority(prio_); 
        FloodNode* newNode = new FloodNode(); 
        newNode->agent =  newAgent; 
        newNode->next = floodList; 
        floodList = newNode; 
      } else { 
        cout << argv[2] << " is not a valid flood agent " << endl; 
      } 
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    return (TCL_OK); 
    } 
  } 
 
  // If the command hasn't been processed by ControlAgent()::command, 
  // call the command() function for the base class 




// received a sniffed code point 
void ControlAgent::recv(Packet* p, Handler* h) { 
 
  hdr_ip* iph = hdr_ip::access(p); 
 
  // store the newly changed code pt as the controller's code pt 
  prio_ = iph->prio();   
  FloodNode* nodePtr = floodList; 
 
  // Notify each flood agent of the CP change.  In reality this would  
  // have to be transmitted over at least one link, which would take a 
  // finite amount of time.  However, because the addresses of the 
  // flood sources are all changed to match that of the target, sending 
  // a packet to them breaks the Classifier code.  This hack takes zero 
  // sim time, but we compensate by increasing the delay on the 
  // flooder's outgoing links in the simulation script. 
  while (nodePtr) { 
    nodePtr->agent->set_priority(prio_); 
    nodePtr = nodePtr->next; 
  } 
     
  // Discard the packet 














#define MAX_DROPS 3 
#define DROP_WINDOW 5.0 
 
using namespace std; 
 
//specify STL template arguments and rename 
typedef deque<double> timeDeque; 
typedef timeDeque::iterator timeDequeIter; 
 
class FeedbackInfo { //stores info about a specific src/dest pair 
public: 
   FeedbackInfo(); 
   timeDeque times; 
   bool running; 
   long cp1, cp2, seedKey; 
   int maxDrops; 
   double dropWin, keyWin; 
}; 
 
typedef map<ns_addr_t, FeedbackInfo> dest2Fbi; 
typedef dest2Fbi::iterator dest2FbiIter; 
typedef pair<ns_addr_t,FeedbackInfo> destFbiPair; 
typedef map<ns_addr_t,dest2Fbi> src2Dest; 
typedef src2Dest::iterator src2DestIter; 
typedef pair<ns_addr_t,dest2Fbi> srcDestPair; 
 
class dsFeedback { 
  friend class IcmpAgent; 
public: 
  static const int INVALID_CP; 
  static void dropNotify(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest, 
                         double dropTime, IcmpAgent* icmpAgent); 
  static long generateNextCodePt(const long prev); 
  static long generateInitCodePt(const long seedKey, 
                                 const long secretKey); 
  static bool isFeedbackRunning(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest); 
  static bool isCodePtValid(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest,long codePt); 
private: 
  static src2Dest feedbackTable; 
  static const long secretKey; 
  static void sendFeedback (ns_addr_t src, IcmpAgent* icmpAgent, 










//initialize static members 
src2Dest dsFeedback::feedbackTable;  
const int dsFeedback::INVALID_CP = -1; 
const long dsFeedback::secretKey = rand(); 
 
// define the less than operator for struct ns_addr_t (see config.h)  
// so we can use it in STL containers 
bool operator< (const ns_addr_t& n1, const ns_addr_t& n2) { 
   return ( (n1.addr_ < n2.addr_) || 





 * void dropNotify(src, dest, dropTime, icmpAgent)  
 * PRE: None 
 * POST: src/dest pair exists in feedbackTable with dropTime as the 
 *       last entry in its timeDeque.  If MAX_DROPS is exceeded, a 
 *       feedback message has been sent to src 
 * RETURN: void 
 *********************************************************************/ 
void dsFeedback::dropNotify(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest, 
                            double dropTime, IcmpAgent* icmpAgent) { 
 
  // check to see if this source has an entry already 
  src2DestIter srcIter = feedbackTable.find(src); 
 
  if (srcIter != feedbackTable.end()) {  
 
    //if so, check to see if src is already paired with dest 
    dest2FbiIter destIter = srcIter->second.find(dest); 
  
    if (destIter != srcIter->second.end()) {  
 
 //if so, add dropTime to the list 
      FeedbackInfo* fbi = &(destIter->second); 
      timeDeque* times_ = &(fbi->times); 
      times_->push_back(dropTime); 
 
      //remove all previous drop times outside the current window 
      while (times_->front() < (dropTime - fbi->dropWin)) { 
         times_->pop_front(); 
      } 
 
      //if over drop limit for time window, and feedback not already 
      //active for this pair, send feedback 
      if ( !(fbi->running) && (times_->size() >= MAX_DROPS) ) {  
        long seed = rand(); 
        double keyWindow = 0.100;  //100 milliseconds 
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        fbi->running = true; 
        fbi->cp1 = 0; 
        fbi->cp2 = generateInitCodePt(seed, secretKey); 
        fbi->keyWin = keyWindow; 
        fbi->seedKey = seed; 
        icmpagent->sendFB(src, seed, keyWindow); 
        return; 
      } 
 
    } else { //no entry for this (src,dest) pair 
      FeedbackInfo fbi; 
      srcIter->second.insert(destFbiPair(dest,fbi)); 
 
      // can't just insert dropTime, since one drop may be enough to 
      // trigger feedback message.  Notify again instead 
      dropNotify(src, dest, dropTime, icmpAgent);  
    } 
 
  } else {//add new entries for src,dest, and dropTime 
    FeedbackInfo fbi; 
    dest2Fbi d2f; 
    d2f.insert(destFbiPair(dest,fbi)); 
    feedbackTable.insert(srcDestPair(src,d2f)); 
 
    // can't just insert dropTime, since one drop may be enough to 
    // trigger feedback message.  Notify again instead 
    dropNotify(src, dest, dropTime, icmpAgent); 
  } 
  return; 




 * bool isCodePtValid(src,dest,codePt)  
 * PRE:  None 
 * POST: if codePt = cp2 in the src/dest entry of the feedback table, 
 *       cp1 is assigned cp2, and a new value for cp2 is generated. 
 * RETURN: true if code point is valid or there is no entry for this 
 *         src/dest pair, false otherwise 
 *********************************************************************/ 
bool dsFeedback::isCodePtValid(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest, 
                                                        long codePt) { 
 
  src2DestIter srcIter = feedbackTable.find(src); 
 
  if (srcIter != feedbackTable.end()) { 
    dest2FbiIter destIter = srcIter->second.find(dest); 
 
    if (destIter != srcIter->second.end()) { 
      FeedbackInfo* fbi = &(destIter->second); 
 
      if (fbi->running) { //don't check if FB isn't active 
 
        if (fbi->cp1 != codePt) { 
 
          if (fbi->cp2 != codePt) { return false; } 
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          else { // codePt = cp2 
            fbi->cp1 = fbi->cp2; 
            fbi->cp2 = generateNextCodePt(fbi->cp2); 
          } 
        }  
      } 
    } 
  } 
  return true; 




 * long generateNextCodePt(prev)  
 * PRE: None 
 * POST: None 
 * RETURN: A code point between 1 and 255 generated based on the 
 *         previous code point 
 *********************************************************************/ 
long dsFeedback::generateNextCodePt(const long prev) { 
  long nextCodePt; 
   
  //replace this section with the desired hash function    
  // hash function 
  nextCodePt = prev % 255 + 1; 
  // end hash function 
 
  return nextCodePt; 




 * bool feedbackRunning(src,dest) 
 * PRE: None 
 * POST: None 
 * RETURN: True if the feedback mechanism is active for this src/dest 
 *         pair, false otherwise 
 *********************************************************************/ 
bool dsFeedback::isFeedbackRunning(ns_addr_t src, ns_addr_t dest) { 
  src2DestIter srcIter = feedbackTable.find(src); 
 
  if (srcIter != feedbackTable.end()) { 
    dest2FbiIter destIter = srcIter->second.find(dest); 
 
    if (destIter != srcIter->second.end()) { 
      return destIter->second.running; 
 
    } else { //in anticipation of checking this pair again later 
      FeedbackInfo fbi; 
      srcIter->second.insert(destFbiPair(dest,fbi)); 
    } 
 
  } else { //in anticipation of checking this pair again later 
    FeedbackInfo fbi; 
    dest2Fbi d2f; 
    d2f.insert(destFbiPair(dest,fbi)); 
    feedbackTable.insert(srcDestPair(src,d2f)); 
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  } 
 
  return false; 




 * int generateInitCodePt(const long seedKey, const long secretKey) 
 * PRE: None 
 * POST: None 
 * RETURN: The initial code point based on seedKey and secretKey 
 *********************************************************************/ 
long dsFeedback::generateInitCodePt(const long seedKey, 
                                    const long secretKey) { 
  long combinedKey = seedKey ^ secretKey; 
  return generateNextCodePt(combinedKey); 




 * FeedbackInfo() 
 * Constructor for class FeedbackInfo 
 *********************************************************************/ 
FeedbackInfo::FeedbackInfo() { 
  running = false; 
  cp1 = 0; 
  cp2 = 0; 
  maxDrops = MAX_DROPS; 
  dropWin = DROP_WINDOW; 
  keyWin = 0; 
















struct hdr_icmp { 
  ns_addr_t origSrc; 
  long seed;        // seed value for the codePt hash function 
  double codePtWin; // how often the sender should change code points 
   
  static int offset_; 
  inline static int& offset() { return offset_; } 
  inline static hdr_icmp* access(const Packet* p) { 
    return (hdr_icmp*) p->access(offset_); 




class CodePtTimer : public TimerHandler { 
public: 
   CodePtTimer (SnifferAgent* srcAgent, long newCP, double codePtWin); 
   void expire(Event* e); 
 
protected: 
   SnifferAgent* agent; 
   long currentCP; 




class IcmpAgent : public Agent { 
public: 
  IcmpAgent(); 
  IcmpAgent(packet_t type); 
  int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
  void recv(Packet*, Handler*); 
  void sendFB(ns_addr_t src, long seed, double keyWindow); 
 
private: 












// CodePtTimer constructor  
CodePtTimer::CodePtTimer(SnifferAgent* src, long newCP, double cpWin)  
       : TimerHandler(), agent(src), delay(cpWin), currentCP(newCP){}; 
 
// Definition of virtual function declared in base class TimerHandler 
void CodePtTimer::expire(Event* e) { 
 
   if (agent != 0) { 
      cout << "Agent changing code pt..."  <<  endl; 
      currentCP = dsFeedback::generateNextCodePt(currentCP); 
      agent->set_priority(currentCP); 
      resched(delay); 
   } 
} 
 
// Add ICMP header to OTcl hierarchy 
static class IcmpHeaderClass : public PacketHeaderClass { 
public: 
 IcmpHeaderClass() : PacketHeaderClass("PacketHeader/ICMP",  
           sizeof(hdr_icmp)) { 
  bind_offset(&hdr_icmp::offset_); 
        } 
 void export_offsets() { 
  field_offset("origSrc", OFFSET(hdr_icmp, origSrc)); 
  field_offset("seed", OFFSET(hdr_icmp, seed)); 





// Add ICMPAgent class to OTcl hierarchy 
static class IcmpClass : public TclClass { 
public: 
 IcmpClass() : TclClass("Agent/ICMP") {} 
 TclObject* create(int, const char*const*) { 




// IcmpAgent constructors 
IcmpAgent::IcmpAgent() : Agent(PT_ICMP) { 




IcmpAgent::IcmpAgent(packet_t type) : Agent(type) { 





int IcmpAgent::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) { 
 
  if (argc == 2) { 
 
    if (strcmp(argv[1], "send") == 0) { 
      Packet* p = allocpkt(); 
      hdr_icmp* hdr = hdr_icmp::access(p); 
      hdr->seed = 2; 
      hdr->codePtWin = 0.005; 
      send(p,0); 
    } 
  } 
 
  // If the command hasn't been processed by IcmpAgent()::command, 
  // call the command() function for the base class 





 * void recv(pkt,h) 
 * PRE:  Packet pkt contains the port number of the agent whose  
 *       dropped packet caused the feedback message to be sent 
 * POST: DoS countermeasure is started for that agent 
 * RETURN: void 
 *********************************************************************/ 
void IcmpAgent::recv(Packet* pkt, Handler* h) { 
  hdr_icmp* hdr = hdr_icmp::access(pkt); 
  long seed = hdr->seed; 
 
  // Call the OTcl procedure 'Agent/Icmp get-agent-handle {port}' 
  // which returns a handle to the source agent (see ns-diffserv.tcl) 
  char out[128]; 
  sprintf(out, "%s get-agent-handle %d", name(), hdr->origSrc.port_);  
  Tcl& tcl = Tcl::instance(); 
  tcl.eval(out); 
  SnifferAgent* src = (SnifferAgent*) TclObject::lookup(tcl.result()); 
   
  if (src != 0) { 
    //Calculate new code point and change it 
    long newCP =  
          dsFeedback::generateInitCodePt(seed, dsFeedback::secretKey); 
    src->set_priority(newCP); 
    //create timer and schedule the next code point change 
    timer = new CodePtTimer(src, newCP, hdr->codePtWin); 
    timer->sched(hdr->codePtWin); 
  } else { 
    cout << "No object in lookup table for " << tcl.result() << endl; 
  } 
 
  // free the memory assigned to the received packet 





 * void recv(pkt,h) 
 * PRE:  None 
 * POST: Feedback message sent to src 
 * RETURN: void 
 *********************************************************************/ 
void IcmpAgent::sendFB(ns_addr_t src, long seed, double keyWindow) { 
  Packet* p = allocpkt(); 
  hdr_icmp* hdr = hdr_icmp::access(p); 
  hdr->origSrc = src; 
  hdr->seed = seed; 
  hdr->codePtWin = keyWindow; 





Agent instproc set_priority {newprio} { 
    $self instvar prio_ 




Agent instproc prio {} { 
    $self instvar prio_ 




Agent/ICMP instproc get-agent-handle {port} { 
    $self instvar node_ 
    set src_agent [$node_ agent $port] 













class SnifferAgent : public UdpAgent { 
public: 
  SnifferAgent(); 
  SnifferAgent(packet_t type); 
  inline int prio() { return prio_;}; 
 
  // override functions in parent classes 
  int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
  void sendmsg(int nbytes, const char* flags);  
  void set_priority(int priority); 
 
private: 
  bool codePtChanged; 
  ControlAgent* controller;  











// Add SnifferAgent to thew OTcl hierarchy 
static class SnifferClass : public TclClass { 
public: 
 SnifferClass() : TclClass("Agent/UDP/Sniffer") {} 
 TclObject* create(int, const char*const*) { 




// SnifferAgent constructors 
SnifferAgent::SnifferAgent() : UdpAgent() { 
        controller = NULL; 
        codePtChanged = true; 
 bind("packetSize_", &size_); 
} 
 
SnifferAgent::SnifferAgent(packet_t type) : UdpAgent(type) { 
        controller = NULL; 
        codePtChanged = true; 





int SnifferAgent::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) { 
  Agent* srcAgent = NULL; 
 
  if (argc == 3) { 
 
    // C++ implmentation of OTcl  
    // 'Agent/UDP/Sniffer set-controller <agent-handle>' 
    if (strcmp(argv[1], "set-controller") == 0) { 
      ControlAgent* newAg = (ControlAgent*)TclObject::lookup(argv[2]); 
 
      if (newAg != NULL) { 
        controller = newAg; 
      } else { 
        cout << argv[2] <<  " is not a valid agent " << endl; 
      } 
    return (TCL_OK); 
    } 
  } 
 
  // If the command hasn't been processed by SnifferAgent()::command, 
  // call the command() function for the base class 




void SnifferAgent::sendmsg(int nbytes, const char* flags) { 
  Packet* snfPkt = NULL; 
 
  // notify controller only when code point has changed 
  if (codePtChanged && (controller != NULL)) { 
    codePtChanged = false; 
    snfPkt = allocpkt(); 
    hdr_ip* ip_snf = hdr_ip::access(snfPkt); 
    ip_snf->dst_ = controller->here(); 
  } 
 
  //need to ensure that packet is sent before it is "sniffed" 
  UdpAgent::sendmsg(nbytes, flags); 
 
  if (snfPkt != NULL) { 
    // send "sniffed" code point to controller 
    Connector::send(snfPkt,0); 




void SnifferAgent::set_priority(int priority) { 
  prio_ = priority; 
  // ensure that a changed code point triggers a message to the 
  // sniffer controller when the next packet is sent by this source 











class FloodAgent : public UdpAgent { 
public: 
  FloodAgent(); 
  FloodAgent(packet_t type); 
  int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
  void recv(Packet* p, Handler* h); 









static class FloodClass : public TclClass { 
public: 
 FloodClass() : TclClass("Agent/UDP/Flood") {} 
 TclObject* create(int, const char*const*) { 





FloodAgent::FloodAgent() : UdpAgent() { 




FloodAgent::FloodAgent(packet_t type) : UdpAgent(type) { 




int FloodAgent::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) { 
  // call the command() function for the base class 
  return (UdpAgent::command(argc, argv)); 
} 
 
void FloodAgent::recv(Packet* p, Handler* h) { 
  hdr_ip* iph = hdr_ip::access(p); 
  set_priority(iph->prio()); 
 
  // Discard the packet 
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67 
APPENDIX B. MODIFIED NS2 SOURCE CODE 
Files listed in this appendix are modified versions of existing ns2 files.  





 * Copyright (c) 1993-1997 Regents of the University of California. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
 *    distribution. 
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 
 *    software must display the following acknowledgement: 
 *    This product includes software developed by the Computer Systems 
 *    Engineering Group at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. 
 * 4. Neither the name of the University nor of the Laboratory may be 
 *    used 
 *    to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 
 *    specific prior written permission. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' 
 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 
 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR  
 * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,  
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT  
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF  
 * USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND  
 * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,  
 * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT  
 * OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF  












#define TIMER_IDLE 0 
#define TIMER_PENDING 1 
 
/*  
 * Note that timers are now implemented using timer-handler.{cc,h} 
 */ 
 





// store old value of traced vars 
// work only for TracedVarTcl 
struct OldValue { 
    TracedVar *var_; 
    char val_[TRACEVAR_MAXVALUELENGTH]; 
    struct OldValue *next_; 
}; 
 
class Agent : public Connector { 
 public: 
    Agent(packet_t pktType); 
    virtual ~Agent(); 
    void recv(Packet*, Handler*); 
     
    //added for edrop tracing - ratul 
    void recvOnly(Packet *) {}; 
 
    void send(Packet* p, Handler* h) { target_->recv(p, h); } 
    virtual void timeout(int tno); 
 
    virtual void sendmsg(int sz, AppData*, const char* flags = 0); 
    virtual void send(int sz, AppData *data) { sendmsg(sz, data, 0); } 
    virtual void sendto(int sz, AppData*, const char* flags = 0); 
 
    virtual void sendmsg(int nbytes, const char *flags = 0); 
    virtual void send(int nbytes) { sendmsg(nbytes); } 
    virtual void sendto(int nbytes, const char* flags, nsaddr_t dst); 
    virtual void connect(nsaddr_t dst); 
    virtual void close(); 
    virtual void listen(); 
    virtual void attachApp(Application* app); 
    virtual int& size() { return size_; } 
    inline nsaddr_t& addr() { return here_.addr_; } 
    inline nsaddr_t& port() { return here_.port_; } 
    inline nsaddr_t& daddr() { return dst_.addr_; } 
    inline nsaddr_t& dport() { return dst_.port_; } 
    void set_pkttype(packet_t pkttype) { type_ = pkttype; } 
    void set_priority(int priority) { prio_ = priority; } //[FEEDBACK] 
 
 protected: 
    int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
    virtual void delay_bind_init_all(); 
    virtual int delay_bind_dispatch(const char *varName, 
                             const char *localName, TclObject *tracer); 
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    virtual void recvBytes(int bytes); 
    virtual void idle(); 
    Packet* allocpkt() const;  // alloc + set up new pkt 
    Packet* allocpkt(int) const; // same, but w/data buffer 
    void initpkt(Packet*) const; // set up fields in a pkt 
 
    ns_addr_t here_;  // address of this agent 
    ns_addr_t dst_;   // destination address for pkt flow 
    int size_;   // fixed packet size 
    packet_t type_;   // type to place in packet header 
    int fid_;   // for IPv6 flow id field 
    int prio_;   // for IPv6 prio field 
    int flags_;   // for experiments (see ip.h) 
    int defttl_;   // default ttl for outgoing pkts 
 
#ifdef notdef 
    int seqno_;  /* current seqno */ 
    int class_;  /* class to place in packet header */ 
#endif 
 
    static int uidcnt_; 
 
    Tcl_Channel channel_; 
    char *traceName_;  // name used in agent traces 
    OldValue *oldValueList_;  
 
    Application *app_;  // ptr to application for callback 
 
    virtual void trace(TracedVar *v); 
    void deleteAgentTrace(); 
    void addAgentTrace(const char *name); 
    void monitorAgentTrace(); 
    OldValue* lookupOldValue(TracedVar *v); 
    void insertOldValue(TracedVar *v, const char *value); 
    void dumpTracedVars(); 
 private: 






/* Copyrights (c) 2000 Nortel Networks 
********************************************************************** 
 * All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the  
 *    distribution. 
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this  
 *    software 
 *    must display the following acknowledgement: 
 *      This product includes software developed by Nortel Networks. 
 * 4. The name of the Nortel Networks may not be used 
 *    to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 
 *    specific prior written permission. 
 *  
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NORTEL AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,  
 * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL NORTEL OR  
 * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,  
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT  
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF  
 * USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND  
 * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,  
 * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY  
 * OF SUCH DAMAGE. 
 * 
 * Developed by: Farhan Shallwani, Jeremy Ethridge 
 *               Peter Pieda, and Mandeep Baines 




 * dsred.h 
 * 
 * The Positions of dsREDQueue, edgeQueue, and coreQueue in the Object  
 * Hierarchy. 
 * 
 * This class, i.e. "dsREDQueue", is positioned in the class hierarchy  
 * as follows: 
 * 
 *             Queue 
 *               | 
 *           dsREDQueue 
 * 
 * 
 *   This class stands for "Differentiated Services RED Queue".  Since  
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 * the original RED does not support multiple parameters, and other  
 * functionality needed by a RED gateway in a Diffserv architecture,  
 * this class was created to support the desired functionality.  This  
 * class is then inherited by two more classes, moulding the old  
 * hierarchy as follows: 
 * 
 * 
 *             Queue 
 *               | 
 *           dsREDQueue 
 *           |        | 
 *     edgeQueue    coreQueue 
 * 
 * 
 * These child classes correspond to the "edge" and "core" routers in a  








#include "red.h" // need RED class specs (edp definition, for example) 
#include "queue.h" // need Queue class specs 
#include "dsredq.h" 
#include "agent.h" 
#include "icmp.h" //[FEEDBACK] 
 
 
/* The dsRED class supports the creation of up to MAX_QUEUES physical  
 * queues at each network device, with up to MAX_PREC virtual queues in 
 * each queue. */  
#define MAX_QUEUES 8 // maximum number of physical RED queues 
#define MAX_PREC 3  // maximum number of virtual RED queues in one 
                    // physical queue 
#define MAX_CP 256 // maximum number of code points in a 
simulation 
#define MEAN_PKT_SIZE 1000  // default mean packet size, in bytes, 
                              // needed for RED calculations 
 
enum schedModeType {schedModeRR, schedModeWRR, schedModeWIRR, 
schedModePRI}; 
 
#define PKT_MARKED 3 
#define PKT_EDROPPED 2 
#define PKT_ENQUEUED 1 





    This struct is used to maintain entries for the PHB parameter 
table, used  
to map a code point to a physical queue-virtual queue pair. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
struct phbParam { 
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   int codePt_; 
   int queue_; // physical queue 
   int prec_; // virtual queue (drop precedence) 
}; 
 
struct statType { 
 long drops;       // per queue stats 
 long edrops; 
 long pkts; 
 long valid_CP[MAX_CP];  // per CP stats 
 long drops_FB; // [FEEDBACK]packets droped due to feedback 
 long drops_CP[MAX_CP]; 
 long edrops_CP[MAX_CP]; 





class dsREDQueue  
    This class specifies the characteristics for a Diffserv RED router. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
class dsREDQueue : public Queue { 
public:  
   dsREDQueue(); 
   int command(int argc, const char*const* argv); // interface to ns 
                                                  //scripts 
 
protected: 
  redQueue redq_[MAX_QUEUES]; // the physical queues at the router 
  NsObject* de_drop_;  // drop_early target 
  IcmpAgent* icmpAgent; //[FEEDBACK] the icmp agent associated with 
                        // this queue 
  statType stats; // used for statistics gatherings 
  int qToDq; // current queue to be dequeued in a round robin manner 
  int numQueues_; // the number of physical queues at the router 
  int numPrec;   // the number of virtual queues in each physical queue 
  phbParam phb_[MAX_CP];  // PHB table 
  int phbEntries;     // the current number of entries in the PHB table 
  int ecn_;          // used for ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) 
  LinkDelay* link_;  // outgoing link 
    int schedMode;                  // the Queue Scheduling mode 
    int queueWeight[MAX_QUEUES];    // A queue weight per queue 
    double queueMaxRate[MAX_QUEUES]; // Max Rate for Priority Queueing 
    double queueAvgRate[MAX_QUEUES]; // Avg Rate for Priority Queueing 
    double queueArrTime[MAX_QUEUES]; // Arr Time for Priority Queueing 
      int slicecount[MAX_QUEUES]; 
      int pktcount[MAX_QUEUES]; 
      int wirrTemp[MAX_QUEUES]; 
      unsigned char wirrqDone[MAX_QUEUES]; 
  int queuesDone; 
 
  void reset(); 
  void edrop(Packet* p); // used so flowmonitor can monitor early drops 
  void enque(Packet *pkt); // enques a packet 
  Packet *deque(void); // deques a packet 
  int getCodePt(Packet *p); // given a packet, extract the code point 
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                            // marking from its header field 
  void selectQueueToDeque();// round robin scheduling dequing algorithm 
  void lookupPHBTable(int codePt, int* queue, int* prec); // looks up  
                 //queue and prec numbers corresponding to a code point 
  void addPHBEntry(int codePt, int queue, int prec); // edits phb entry 
                                                     // in the table 
  void setNumPrec(int curPrec); 
  void setMREDMode(const char* mode, const char* queue); 
  void printStats(); // print various stats 
  double getStat(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
  void printPHBTable();  // print the PHB table 
  void setSchedularMode(const char* schedtype); //Sets the schedular 
                                                // mode 
  void addQueueWeights(int queueNum, int weight); // Add a maxRate to a 
                                                  // PRI queue 
  void addQueueRate(int queueNum, int rate); // Add a weigth to a WRR 
                                             // or WIRR queue 
  void printWRRcount();  // print various stats 
  void applyTSWMeter(Packet *pkt); // apply meter to calculate average 






/* Copyrights (c) 2000 Nortel Networks 
********************************************************************** 
 * All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the  
 *    distribution. 
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this  
 *    software 
 *    must display the following acknowledgement: 
 *      This product includes software developed by Nortel Networks. 
 * 4. The name of the Nortel Networks may not be used 
 *    to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 
 *    specific prior written permission. 
 *  
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NORTEL AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,  
 * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL NORTEL OR  
 * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,  
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT  
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF  
 * USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND  
 * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,  
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 * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY  
 * OF SUCH DAMAGE. 
 * 
 * Developed by: Farhan Shallwani, Jeremy Ethridge 
 *               Peter Pieda, and Mandeep Baines 























void enque(Packet* pkt)  
    The following method outlines the enquing mechanism for a Diffserv 
router. 




void dsREDQueue::enque(Packet* pkt) { 
  int codePt, queue, prec; 
  hdr_ip* iph = hdr_ip::access(pkt); 
  ns_addr_t src = iph->src(); 
  ns_addr_t dst = iph->dst(); 
  bool dropped = false; //[FEEDBACK] 
 
  codePt = iph->prio();//extracting the marking done by the edge router 
  int ecn = 0; 
  double now = Scheduler::instance().clock(); 
 
  stats.pkts++; 
 
// [FEEDBACK]  
#ifdef ds_feedback_h 
  //if codePt is invalid, drop without any other processing 
  if (codePt == dsFeedback::INVALID_CP) { 
    cout << "Dropped due to invalid CP" << endl; 
    stats.drops_FB++; // [FEEDBACK] increment count of 
                      // feedback related drops 
    stats.drops++; 
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    drop(pkt); 
    dropped = true; 
  } 
#endif 
 
  if (!dropped) {  //[FEEDBACK] allow further processing 
    //looking up queue and prec numbers for that codept 
    lookupPHBTable(codePt, &queue, &prec);  
 
    // code added for ECN support 
    hdr_flags* hf = hdr_flags::access(pkt); 
//line 200 
    if (ecn_ && hf->ect()) ecn = 1; 
 
    stats.pkts_CP[codePt]++; 
     
    switch(redq_[queue].enque(pkt, prec, ecn)) { 
      case PKT_ENQUEUED: 
        break; 
 
      case PKT_DROPPED: 
        stats.drops_CP[codePt]++; 
        stats.drops++; 
        cout << "Dropped by dsredq." << endl; 
 
#ifdef ds_feedback_h 
        //[FEEDBACK] notify sender of packet dropped by edge router 
        if (!dsFeedback::isFeedbackRunning(src,dst)) { 
          dsFeedback::dropNotify(src, dst, now, icmpAgent); 
        } 
#endif 
 
        drop(pkt); 
        break; 
 
      case PKT_EDROPPED: 
        stats.edrops_CP[codePt]++; 
        stats.edrops++; 
        cout << "Early dropped by dsredq." << endl;  
 
#ifdef ds_feedback_h 
        //[FEEDBACK] notify sender of packet dropped by edge router 
        if (!dsFeedback::isFeedbackRunning(src,dst)) { 
          dsFeedback::dropNotify(src, dst, now, icmpAgent); 
        } 
#endif 
 
        edrop(pkt); 
        break; 
 
      case PKT_MARKED: 
        hf->ce() = 1;  // mark Congestion Experienced bit   
        break;    
 
      default: 
        break; 
    } 
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int command(int argc, const char*const* argv) 
    Commands from the ns file are interpreted through this interface. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-------*/ 








  if (argc == 3) {  //[FEEDBACK] set the icmp agent handle  
 
    if (strcmp(argv[1], "set-icmp-agent") == 0) { 
      Tcl& tcl = Tcl::instance(); 
      IcmpAgent* agent = (IcmpAgent*) TclObject::lookup(argv[2]); 
 
      if (agent == NULL) { 
        tcl.resultf("[dsRED][FEEDBACK] No agent %s", argv[2]); 
      return (TCL_ERROR); 
      }  
 
      icmpAgent = agent; 
      return(TCL_OK); 
    } 
  }   
 
 









# Author: Matthew Braun 
# Dates: Aug 28, 2002 
# Notes: Heavily modified from the example file  
# ~ns/tcl/ex/diffserv/ds-cbr-TSW3CM.tcl written by Jeremy Ethridge. 
# 
#  ----       ------            ------   ----   ------   ----   ------ 
#  |s1|-------|ext1|------------|ext2|---|e1|---|core|---|e2|---|dest| 
#  ----       ------            ------   ----   ------   ----   ------ 
#                |                | 
#                |                | 
#                |                | 
#                |                | 
#                |                |                            
#                |                |                           
#             --------          ----          
#             |attack|----------|z1| 
#             --------          ---- 
#                   
#--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
#    W = 2d 
#  r+A = 2CIR 
# good source sends 2500 packets (2.0 seconds) while under attack 
 
set ns [new Simulator] 
set nf [open test_def.nam w] 
set dest_trace [open dest.trace w] 
#$ns namtrace-all $nf 
 
proc finish {} { 
     global ns nf 
     $ns flush-trace 
     close $nf 
#     exec nam test_def.nam & 
     exit 0 
} 
 
# difference between paths 
  set delta "110ms" 
 
# tokenBucket parameters 
  set cir0   10000000 
  set cbs0       4001 
 
# source parameters rates 
  set rate0  10000000 
  set rate1  10000000 
  set packetSize 1000 
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# pareto (or exponential) parameters 
  set burstTime 500ms 
  set idleTime  20ms 
  set parShape 1.9 
 
# port numbers  
  set udpPort 1 
  set icmpPort 2 
  set cbrPort 1 
 
# traffic type in use 
#  set traf_type "Exponential" 
#  set traf_type "Pareto" 
 set traf_type "CBR" 
 
# simulation parameters 
  set testTime 2.5 
 
# Set up the network topology shown at the top of this file: 
$ns node-config -addressingType heir 
set source1 [$ns node]  
 
set attacker [$ns node] 
set extern1 [$ns node] 
set extern2 [$ns node] 
 
# Set src addr of malicioius packets to the addr of the good src 
set flood1 [$ns node [$source1 node-addr]] 
set flood2 [$ns node [$source1 node-addr]] 
 
set edge1 [$ns node] 
set core [$ns node] 
set edge2 [$ns node] 
set dest [$ns node] 
 
#create links between nodes 
$ns duplex-link $source1 $extern1 100Mb 10ms DropTail 
#set link_src_ext [$ns link $source1 $extern1] 
#$source1 add-route [$attacker id] [$link_src_ext head] 
 
$ns duplex-link $extern1 $attacker 100Mb $delta DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $extern1 $extern2  100Mb 100ms DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $attacker $zombie1 1Mb 100ms DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $attacker $zombie2 1Mb 100ms DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $zombie1 $extern2  1000Mb  100ms DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $zombie2 $extern2  1000Mb  100ms DropTail 
$ns duplex-link $extern2 $edge1    1000Mb  10ms DropTail 
 
 
$ns duplex-link $edge2 $dest 100Mb 5ms DropTail 
$ns simplex-link $edge1 $core 100Mb 5ms dsRED/edge 
$ns simplex-link $core $edge1 100Mb 5ms dsRED/core 
$ns simplex-link $core $edge2 100Mb 5ms dsRED/core 




#nam layout of nodes 
$ns duplex-link-op $source1 $extern1 orient down-right 
$ns duplex-link-op $extern1 $extern2 orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $attacker $extern1 orient up 
$ns duplex-link-op $attacker $zombie1 orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $attacker $zombie2 orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $zombie1 $extern2 orient up 
$ns duplex-link-op $zombie2 $extern2 orient up 
$ns duplex-link-op $extern2 $edge1 orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $edge1 $core orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $core $edge2 orient right 
$ns duplex-link-op $edge2 $dest orient down 
 
 
#create dsred queues on the simplex links in the DS domain 
set qE1C [[$ns link $edge1 $core] queue] 
set qE2C [[$ns link $edge2 $core] queue] 
set qCE1 [[$ns link $core $edge1] queue] 
set qCE2 [[$ns link $core $edge2] queue] 
 
 
# Set DS RED parameters from Edge1 to Core: 
$qE1C meanPktSize $packetSize 
$qE1C set numQueues_ 2 
$qE1C setNumPrec 1 
$qE1C setMREDMode DROP 
$qE1C setSchedularMode PRI 
$qE1C addQueueRate 0 $cir0 
$qE1C addPolicyEntry [$source1 node-addr] 
                        [$dest node-addr] TokenBucket 10 $cir0 $cbs0 
$qE1C addPolicerEntry TokenBucket 10 0 
$qE1C addPHBEntry  0 1 0 
$qE1C addPHBEntry 10 0 0 
$qE1C configQ 0 0 10 20 0.99 
$qE1C configQ 1 0  0  0 1.00 
 
 
# Set DS RED parameters from Core to Edge2: 
$qCE2 meanPktSize $packetSize 
$qCE2 set numQueues_ 2 
$qCE2 setNumPrec 1  
$qCE2 addPHBEntry  0 1 0 
$qCE2 addPHBEntry 10 0 0 
$qCE2 configQ 1 0  0  0 1.00 
$qCE2 configQ 0 0 10 20 0.10 
 
 
# Set up one connection between good source and the destination: 
set udp1 [new Agent/UDP/Sniffer] 
$udp1 set packetSize_ $packetSize 
$udp1 set prio_ 0 
$source1 attach $udp1 $udpPort 
set valid_traffic [new Application/Traffic/$traf_type] 
$valid_traffic attach-agent $udp1 
$valid_traffic set packet_size_ $packetSize 
$valid_traffic set rate_ $rate0 
$valid_traffic set random_ 1 
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# $valid_traffic set burst_time_ $burstTime 
# $valid_traffic set idle_time_ $idleTime 
# $valid_traffic set shape_ $parShape 
 
 
#null sink for traffic to dest 
set null1 [new Agent/Null] 
$dest attach $null1 $udpPort 
$ns connect $udp1 $null1 
 
 
# Set up control agent at attacker 
set attk1 [new Agent/UDP/Controller] 
$attk1 set packetSize_ $packetSize 
$attk1 set prio_ 0 
$attacker attach $attk1 
 
#connect this controller to the sniffer on source1 
$udp1 set-controller $attk1 
 
# create zombie agents 
set f1 [new Agent/UDP/Flood] 
set f2 [new Agent/UDP/Flood] 
 
 
#create cbr sources to attach to zombies 
set cbr1 [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr1 attach-agent $f1 
$cbr1 set packet_size_ $packetSize 
$cbr1 set rate_ $rate1 
$cbr1 set random_ 1 
set cbr2 [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr2 attach-agent $f2 
$cbr2 set packet_size_ $packetSize 
$cbr2 set rate_ $rate1 
$cbr2 set random_ 1 
 
#attach flood agents to nodes 
$flood1 attach $f1 $udpPort 
$flood2 attach $f2 $udpPort 
 
#connect zombie agents to dest agent 
#set null2 [new Agent/Null] 
#$dest attach $null2 5 
$ns connect $z1 $null1 
$ns connect $z2 $null1 
 
#add flooders to controller 
$attk1 add-flooder $z1 
$attk1 add-flooder $z2 
 
$udp1 set class_ 1 
$f1 set class_ 2 
$f2 set class_ 3 
 
$ns color 1 Green 
$ns color 2 Red 
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$ns color 3 Black 
 
# Set up icmp agents at the good source node and the DS Edge 
set icmp1 [new Agent/ICMP] 
$source1 attach $icmp1 $icmpPort 
 
set icmp2 [new Agent/ICMP] 
$edge1 attach $icmp2 $icmpPort 
 
#need to let this queue know what it's attached icmp agent is 
#so it can tell the agent to send feedback msgs 
$qE1C set-icmp-agent $icmp2 
$ns connect $icmp1 $icmp2 
 
#tracing and mointoring objects 
set dropt [$ns create-trace Drop $dest_trace $source1 $dest] 





$ns at 0.1 "$valid_traffic start" 
$ns at 0.5 "$qE1C printStats" 
$ns at 0.5001 "$cbr1 start" 
$ns at 0.5003 "$cbr2 start" 
$ns at 1.50 "$qE1C printStats" 
 
$ns at $testTime "$valid_traffic stop" 
$ns at $testTime "$cbr1 stop" 
$ns at $testTime "$cbr2 stop" 
$ns at [expr $testTime + 0.2] "$qE1C printStats" 
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